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INTRODUCTION
The federal sentencing process has long been characterized by dynamic
relationships between judges and others who exercise powerful discretion in
shaping criminal sanctions for convicted offenders. The implementation of the
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federal sentencing guidelines1 has altered these relationships in ways not
anticipated by Congress or the United States Sentencing Commission (Commis-
sion), and not recognized by many judges.
Because of these altered interactions, the guidelines system initiated in 1987
simultaneously proceeds on two different levels: (1) the level of formal, visible
adherence to, or open departure from, guideline prescriptions in the trial courts,
followed by review in the courts of appeals; and (2) the level of informal
noncompliance with the new system-practices that are eluding scrutiny by
courts of appeals and are in fact reacting to appellate rejections of reasonable
departures from unreasonable guidelines. Increasingly, the second, underground
level of sentencing seems to be displacing the first, visible level.2
Imposing a new legal structure on a process traditionally governed by
discretion is an important and difficult task. This Article examines the hypothe-
sis that the quality and acceptability of the guidance, rather than the fact of
guidelines, spells the difference between respected reform and rigid failure. To
achieve the requisite level of quality, a guidance system must contemplate
multiple levels of discretion. It must leave ample room for departures from the
guideline range so that judges can accommodate cases of greater and lesser
seriousness. It must be developed by an institution that understands the com-
plexity of criminal sentencing, that appreciates the wisdom, integrity and sense
of justice that animates experienced judges, and that earns the respect of judges
and practitioners.
History teaches that statutorily imposed mandatory sentences are unjust and
often nullified by juries, judges, and prosecutors.3 The imposition of "mandato-
1. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.1.
2. The Commission acknowledges that informal noncompliance with the guidelines is a problem. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF
THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERA-
TION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 419-20 (1991) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. IMPACT
REPORT]. A recent study authorized by the Commission, id. at 393, and conducted by Ilene Nagel, a
Commissioner, and Stephen Schulhofer, acknowledges that circumvention is "an important obstacle to the
success of the guidelines effort." lene H. Nagel & Stephen 3. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1992) (manuscript at 82-17, on file with author). They note that "[tihe principal
problem with guideline circumvention is that circumvention, unlike overt downward departure, is hidden
and unsystematic. It occurs in a context that prevents oversight and obscures accountability." Id. Professor
Schulhofer, in another forthcoming article based in part on the same study, states that preliminary data
"suggests that evasion of the proper guideline sentence may occur in 20-35% of all guilty plea cases."
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1992) (manuscript at 17, on file with author). Because of the
elimination of the judge's power to offset "plea-related disparity" and of parole, he says that "there is
probably a great deal more disparity than pre-guidelines in the 20-35% of the cases affected by manipula-
tion." Id. at 18; see also discussion infra Part 1.B.
3. Over the centuries, historians have recounted numerous instances in which judges, juries, or
prosecutors nullified an oppressive law or evaded its formal strictures to avoid imposing disproportionate
penalties on individual lawbreakers. See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 63 (1935); Douglas Hay,
Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975); Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful
1992] 1683
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ry guidelines" by the new federal administrative agency is now spawning
similar lessons.4 The Commission's tightening of "loopholes," combined with
strict enforcement by courts of appeals hostile to departures, has increased the
level of noncompliance in trial courts. Discretionary actors, including judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers, find themselves torn
between allegiance to rigid rules and an urge to do justice in individual cases.
Unless the Commission and the appellate courts heed these lessons, the
guidelines system will soon lose all credibility.5 In that event, some new
vehicle of sentencing reform, tied more closely to the judiciary and a consulta-
tive process for identifying a common law of sentencing, may be needed.6
This Article examines the guidelines from the vantage point of a close and
continuous observer.7 Part I briefly traces the evolution of the current system.
Ignorance: Informing Jurors About Punishment in Mandatory Sentencing Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L REV.
343 (1983). Some enforced the penalties without exception, out of a sense of paramount duty to the written
law. Others acted in the belief that the prevailing penalty structure was necessary and just. Still others
imposed severe penalties, expecting that their inappropriateness would cause reviewing authorities to grant
clemency before the sentences were actually carried out. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Foreword to William
J. Genego et al., Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 812 (1975);
Hay, supra, at 40, 56-58.
In some jurisdictions, juries rather than judges bear primary responsibility for sentencing. Juries almost
always make the decision to pass a capital sentence. In addition, juries, by acquitting a defendant against
the evidence, may nullify a sentence. Heumann & Cassak, supra, at 352-57; HALL, supra, at 126-30 (noting
widespread practice of 18th-century juries to return fictitious verdicts). The seven states that give the jury
a role in non-capital sentencing are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (Michie 1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.025, 532.055,
532.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 928 (West 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-20-104 to 40-20-107 (1990); TEX. CRIM. CODE ANN. §
37.07 (West 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Michie 1990).
4. This is the Commission's own characterization of its guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
ati (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT]. The Commission prescribed "mandatory
prison sentences" in lieu of probation in its initial 1987 guidelines. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. c,
amend. 307, at 134. "The Commission's solution to this problem has been to write guidelines that classify
as 'serious' (and therefore subject to mandatory prison sentences) many offenses for which probation is now
frequently given." The Commission deleted the parenthetical reference to "mandatory prison sentences"
without explanation in 1990. Id. at 138.
5. The Commission asked 415 judges about "unwarranted sentencing disparity under the sentencing
guideline system compared to the pre-guideline sentencing system." Sixty-four percent of the judges who
responded thought the system was worse off or no better than before the guidelines. Only 36% of those
who expressed an opinion thought disparity had decreased. U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 103
tbl. 25.
6. It is difficult to determine whether the evolving guidelines are "working well." See Michael Tonry,
Are the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines "Working Well"?, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 122 (1989)
(asserting that current data do not indicate how well the sentencing system is working). If the guidelines
are basically on target, critics should be patient and work to improve them through the amendment process.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1988) (stating that Commission "periodically shall review and revise, in consider-
ation of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions
of this section"). If the situation is less optimistic, sponsors and supporters might be well advised to
reconsider.
7. Yale's involvement with sentencing reform dates back to 1974, when a workshop, sponsored by
The Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Program in Criminal Justice, was convened to examine Judge
Frankel's proposal for a federal sentencing commission, MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER 118-24 (1972), against the background of an ongoing law journal study of the relationship
between indeterminate sentencing and parole guidelines. See William J. Genego et al., Parole Release
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Part II describes the four-level guidelines system: policymaking, rulemaking,
sentencing, and reviewing. Part III examines the rulemakers, Congress and the
Commission, concentrating on how the Commission has responded to its
statutory charter. Part IV discusses the sentencers: judges, probation officers,
defense attorneys, and prosecutors. Part V deals with the reviewers: the district
courts and the courts of appeals. It looks especially at the interplay between
the district court sentencing process and guideline enforcement by the appellate
bench.
Part VI considers the panorama of problems and reflects on why the federal
sentencing guidelines are not succeeding. It then suggests corrective action that
might be taken by the judiciary, the Commission, and Congress.
I. A REFORM UNDER FIRE
For most of the last century, our criminal justice system has relied on
indeterminate sentencing. In the last two decades, however, growing dissatisfac-
tion with the disparity and uncertainty of indeterminate sentencing has led to
broad support for the idea of structured sentencing to reduce unwarranted
disparity. The Sentencing Reform Act of 19848 (SRA) symbolized the emerg-
ing consensus in the federal system and many states. 9
Over their first five years, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's guidelines
have provoked dismay and evasion in the federal courts and the bar.10 During
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing, 84 YALE L.J 810 (1975). The workshop produced draft legislation
for a U.S. Commission on Sentencing, which is set forth and explained in PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL.,
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 33-134 (1977).
"The findings of the workshop constituted the foundation of S. 2699, a bill I introduced in the 94th
Congress." Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword to id. at ix.
In 1984, Yale inaugurated a series of Guggenheim Program collaborative workshops for law students
and sentencing judges to examine the principles on which judges exercise discretion in formulating sentences
in state and federal courts, and the impact of sentencing commissions on discretion, disparity, prison
populations, and rationality in sentencing. Following the establishment of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
five of the original seven members of the Commission participated in these workshops. Since 1988, Yale's
sentencing workshops have continued, with the support of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, to
examine discretion, disparity, and issues relating to intermediate punishment, in collaboration with state
judges and prosecutors from Alabama and Delaware.
A work that grew out of the Yale program is DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1988). Another is the Federal Sentencing
Reporter, launched in June 1988 under the sponsorship of the Vera Institute of Justice, edited by Daniel
J. Freed and Marc Miller, and published bimonthly by the University of California Press.
8. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-
3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
9. Various studies, reports, and scholarship highlighted the deficiencies of the pre-guidelines process.
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-50 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3220-
33; AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA (1971); FRANKEL, supra note 7; TWENTIEr CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE
OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
10. A number of federal judges, scholars, and others have criticized the guidelines. See FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 135-43 (1990) [hereinafter
FCSC REPORT]; Judge Edward R. Becker, 3d Cir., Statement to the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n on behalf
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the same period, Congress' proliferation of mandatory minimum penalty
statutes" has elicited protest from the Commission as well as the courts. The
U.S. courts of appeals, while also opposing mandatory penalty statutes,12 have
themselves come under fire for imposing needlessly rigid interpretations of the
guidelines on the district courts. 3
Federal district court judges are tom as to how to respond to this spate of
restrictions on their sentencing discretion,' 4 There is a powerful sense that the
guidelines dictate unjust sentences in too many cases, but reactions by individu-
al judges vary widely. Many judges are conforming to the guidelines with a
deep sense of distress: they believe Congress, not the courts, should remedy
policy problems created by the Commission. Other judges are finding or
acquiescing in alternative routes to justice in sentencing: some are choosing to
risk reversal on appeal by "departing" upward or downward from the guideline
of the Judicial Conference Comm. on Criminal Law and Probation Admin. (Mar. 1990), in 2 FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 238 (1990) [hereinafter Becker Statement]; Judge Vincent L. Broderick, S.D.N.Y. & Judge Mark
Wolf, D. Mass., Statement before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 5, 1991), in 3 FED. SENTENCING REP.
276 (1991) [hereinafter Broderick & Wolf Statement]; Letter from Judge Avern Cohn, E.D. Mich., to Judge
Vincent L. Broderick, S.D.N.Y. (June 5, 1991), in 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 48 (1991); Letter from Judge
Vincent L. Broderick, S.D.N.Y., to Judge Avem Cohn, E.D. Mich. (June 13, 1991), in 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 48 (1991) [hereinafter Broderick Letter]; Letter from Judge Avem Cohn, E.D. Mich., to Judge Vincent
L. Broderick, S.D.N.Y. (June 28, 1991), in 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 48,49 (1991); G. Thomas Eisele, The
Sentencing Guidelines System? No. Sentencing Guidelines? Yes., FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16; Daniel
J. Freed & Marc Miller, Handcuffing the Sentencing Judge: Are Offender Characteristics Becoming
Irrelevant? Are Congressionally Mandated Sentences Displacing Judicial Discretion?, 2 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 189 (1989-1990); Letter from Judge Lawrence K. Karlton, E.D. Cal., to Editors, Federal Sentencing
Reporter (Nov. 20, 1991), in 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 186 (1991) [hereinafter Karlton Letter]; Eugene D.
Natali, The Probation Officer, Bean Counting and Truth in Sentencing, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 102 (1991);
Recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the United States to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, in
3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 282 (1991); William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 339 (1991); Statement of William W. Schwarzer, U.S. District Judge, N.D. Cal.,
Concerning Mandatory Minimum Sentences (Jan. 29, 1990), in 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 186 (1989-1990);
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Mar. 5, 1991), reprinted in 3 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 287 (1991) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (testimony of Judge Mark Wolf, D. Mass. &
Judge Vincent L. Broderick, S.D.N.Y.); Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y.
L.., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2.
For contrary views from federal judges, see Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available
to the Sentencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 10; Andrew J.
Kleinfeld, The Sentencing Guidelines Promote Truth and Justice, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16; Gerald
B. Tjoflat, The Untapped Potential for Judicial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Advice
for Counsel, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 4.
11. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 4, app. A (listing statutory provisions
requiring mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment); see also id. app. B (listing pending mandatory
minimum legislation).
12. See id. app. G.
13. See Schulhofer, supra note 2 (manuscript at 42-51).
14. U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 103 thl. 25 (28% of judges said that guideline sentences
were "mostly inappropriate"; 7% more said they had a mixed opinion); see also Judge Jose Cabranes,
"Supposedly 'Scientific Sentencing' is a 'Dismal Failure,"' Address before the University of Chicago Law
School (Jan. 15, 1992), in CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1992, at 14; Marcia Chambers, Big Moments in The
Law During 1990, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 24, 1990, at 13 (Judge J. Lawrence Irving, S.D. Cal., chose to resign
rather than be reduced by guidelines to "a clerk toting up numbers" and imposing unjust sentences).
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sentence, 15 as authorized by section 3553(b) of the SRA;16 others are impos-
ing reduced sentences in the wake of low-visibility negotiations between
prosecutors and defense attorneys, effectively bypassing the applicable guide-
lines, mandatory penalties, and appellate court rulings. 7
The explanation for most of these responses at the trial court level is not
hard to understand. A sense of justice is essential to one's participation in a
system for allocating criminal penalties. When the penalty structure offends
those charged with the daily administration of the criminal law, tension arises
between the judge's duty to follow the written law and the judge's oath to
administer justice.' 8
As with any tradition-bound system, resistance to change is not unusual.
But when professionals most affected by a change criticize it as being unjust,
their concerns merit careful consideration.
Introducing simple reforms into a complex system is extremely difficult.
This has long been true in the realm of criminal justice.19 A radical reform,
such as the Commission's guidelines, only increases this difficulty and warrants
special attention to the reactions of trial judges, lest the administration of justice
be demeaned.'
A. The Anatomy of Disparity
Under the system of criminal sentencing that prevailed for a century prior
to the SRA, judges received wide ranges within which to sentence, but no
anchoring point from which to begin. 1 When confronting an individual case,
15. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT tbL C-5 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 ANNUAL
REPORT].
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
17. FCSC REPORT, supra note 10, at 138; U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 23; Ilene H.
Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 883, 935-39 (1990); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 2 (manuscript at 1-17); Schulhofer,
supra note 2 (manuscript at 29); Stephen 3. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (1989).
18. "The United States wins its point when justice is done its citizens in the courts." This motto is
inscribed above the entrance to the office of the Attorney General of the United States. The oath prescribed
by statute for federal judges is:
I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge
and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. So help me God.
28 U.S.C. § 453 (1988).
19. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 117-18
(1983); D.A. THOMAS, THE PENAL EQUATION 461 (1978); Daniel J. Freed, The Nonsystem of Criminal
Justice, in LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED 263,272-74 (National Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence ed., 1969).
20. Franklin E. Ziming, Sentencing Reform in the States: Lessons from the 1970s, in REFORM AND
PUNISHMENT 101 (Michael Tonry & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 1983) (emphasizing value of multiple levels
of discretion in justice system).
21. For discussion of the ways in which pre-SRA sentencing judges were left adrift, see sources cited,
supra note 9.
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some judges began at the bottom of the statutory range and adjusted sentences
upward, according to the severity of the crime and the characteristics of the
offender. Other judges started at the top, on the theory that every convicted
offender earned the maximum penalty ("do the crime, earn the time"), subject
to mitigating circumstances and a discount for pleading guilty. Still others
began in midrange, or at some other intermediate point, working up or down
as aggravating and mitigating circumstances surfaced. Personal preference
dictated each judge's methodology, and the Supreme Court's 1949 decision in
Williams v. New Yorle conveyed the message that any authorized sentence,
based on any available information, was likely to survive appeal. Sentences
were rarely explained by the sentencer and ordinarily could not be appealed?23
Consequently, few courts issued sentencing opinions from which others could
seek guidance.2
Knowing that a parole board could later modify any prison term imposed
in open court,2s some judges tried to anticipate parole when formulating a
sentence.26 Others treated parole consequences as beyond their authority or
concern. In either event, the judge lacked power to revise the sentence if her
expectations regarding the timing of parole proved incorrect.27
The absence of sentencing guidance or review and the omnipresent issue
of parole made it inevitable that trial judges would impose different sentences
on similarly situated defendants. The perceived purposes of sentencing only
compounded the problem: judges often disagreed on whether particular catego-
ries of offenders should be incapacitated, rehabilitated, deterred, or punished.28
Each of these purposes was legitimate; there were no authoritative criteria for
selecting one,29 and different purposes could lead to quite different sentences.
Studies demonstrated that similar offenders often received different sentenc-
es upon conviction of similar crimes. Likewise, offenders with significantly
22. 337 U.S. 241 (1949); see also infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
23. Marc Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV.
SCi. & L. 3, 7 (1989).
24. But see, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 108 ER.D. 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (outlining common "goals
of punishment" pursued through sentencing process); United States v. Bergman, 416 F Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (offering detailed summary and examination of sentencing policies and criteria).
25. Under the parole system, sentencing involved a two-stage process: district judges exercised
discretion to set the outer limits of prison terms; then, once a prisoner began to serve his sentence, the parole
commission exercised discretion to shorten it. Genego et al., supra note 7, at 814-15.
26. Jon 0. Newman, A Better Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A. J. 1563, 1565 (1977). In order
to regularize parole and make it more predictable, the Parole Board developed a system of parole guidelines
in the early 1970's. These later received congressional sanction and became predecessors of the Sentencing
Reform Act. See Cenego et al., supra note 7, at 822.
27. Prior to the SRA, FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 provided for a motion to reduce a sentence, if filed within
120 days. Once that period expired, the sentence was final. In United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178
(1979), the Supreme Court ruled that the sentencing judge had no jurisdiction to reduce a sentence after
the Parole Board refused to grant parole at the point of initial eligibility.
28. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 41 & n.18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3224 & n.18; see
also Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1992).
29. But see STANTON WHEELER ET AL, SITING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCNG OF WHmIE-COLLAR
CRIMINALS 166 (1988) (asserting judicial consensus on sentencing criteria and objectives).
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different histories sometimes received identical sentences. In a system without
acknowledged starting points, measuring rods, stated reasons, or principled
review, unwarranted (or at least unexplained) disparity and disproportionality
seemed to flourish. 0
Some observers placed the blame for disparity on judges.3 Others faulted
the system: it lacked up-front standards for selecting sentences and had no
appellate review to provide principles and precedents. At least one critic found
judges rudderless and the system lawless. 32
B. The Statutory Scheme
Arguments against unwarranted disparity persuaded Congress, after a
decade of study and experimentation with guidelines for the exercise of parole
discretion, to structure the discretion of sentencing judges. The theory was that,
if judges adhered to rational guidelines for formulating permissible sentences
and other participants in the process did their jobs properly, unwarranted
disparity would surely decrease.
The first step Congress took to reduce unwarranted disparity was to abolish
the United States Parole Commission. For nearly seventy-five years, that agency
had post-audited the sentences of imprisoned offenders to determine their
suitability for early release.33 Congress eliminated the agency to remove the
uncertainty it created for sentencing judges, prisoners, and the public.34 Sec-
ond, to replace indeterminate sentencing, the SRA empowered district judg-
es-when selecting the sanction of imprisonment-to set determinate terms that
offenders would be required to serve in full, less a minor discount for good
behavior,35 and followed by a period of supervised release. 36 Third, in place
30. ANTHONY PARITRIDGE & WILLLAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A
REPORT To THE JUDGES (1974); cf. S. REP. NO. 225, supra note 9, at 41-50, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3224-33; ALFRED BLUMsTEN Er AL, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 118-23
(1983); O'DONNELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 1-3; WHEELER, supra note 29, at 166-93. For an examination
of parole disparity, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL PAROLE PRACTICES:
BETER MANAGEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ARE NEEDED (1982).
31. See DOUGLAS MCDONALD, ON BLAMING JUDGES: CRIMINAL SENTENCING DECISIONS IN NEW YORK
COURTS: ARE GUIDELINES NEEDED TO RESTRAIN JUDGES? 1-2 (1982) (discussing various criticisms of
unchecked judicial power to determine criminal sentences).
32. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 5.
33. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819 (creating boards of parole at each United States
Penitentiary); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 311, 62 Stat. 854 (creating Board of Parole); Parole Commission
and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4202)
(repealed 1984) (renaming Board of Parole as United States Parole Commission).
34. The theory behind indeterminacy was that imprisonment would serve a rehabilitative function:
parole authorities would recognize the right moment to permit a reformed prisoner to reenter the community.
When that optimistic theory lost credibility, it became evident that a system of uncertain sentences that left
prisoners in limbo and deceived the public served no useful purpose.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (1988).
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of sentence review by a parole board, the SRA authorized courts of appeals to
hear appeals from the sentence imposed.37
Fourth, the SRA established as the centerpiece of reform a specialized
administrative agency, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, to become expert in
sentencing research and to devise guidelines for federal judges. The guidelines
would "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."38 A major goal was to
reduce "unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 39
The Commission received no power to sentence offenders, to adjudicate
petitions, 4 or to enforce its own guidelines. The expectation was that the
guidelines would be drafted by a nonpolitical group of sentencing experts,41
be adopted by a consultative process that took substantial account of prior
practice,42 and be implemented in a way that encouraged respect from the
courts.
The establishment of such a sentencing structure was not unprecedented.4 3
But the manner in which the U.S. Sentencing Commission has carried out
federal reform has been disappointing. The new sentencing guidelines are more
complex,' inflexible, and severe than those devised by any other jurisdic-
tion. The Commission has developed and maintained the guidelines with a
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1988).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (1988). See generally O'DONNELL ETAL, supra note 7 (reviewing current
federal attempts at sentencing reform and proposing alternative sentencing criteria).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
40. The Commission does have the authority to review petitions from defendants seeking guideline
modification. 28 U.S.C. § 994(s) (1988). Only "changed circumstances unrelated to the defendant," however,
can trigger such review. Moreover, the Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 23(b), 101 Stat.
1266, 1271, amended § 994(s), excusing the Commission from having to justify its disapproval of any such
petition.
41. The statute required at least three federal judges to be members of the Commission and made the
Attorney General an ex officio nonvoting member. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). Under Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 235(b)(5), 98 Stat. 1987, 2033 (1984), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note, the chairman of the U.S. Parole
Commission was also made an ex officio nonvoting member.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988).
43. At the time of the SRA's adoption, guideline commissions were at work in Minnesota and
Pennsylvania. See generally ALFRED BLUMsTEIN ET" AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 135-39 (1983); PARENT, supra note 7; SANDRA SHANE-DuBow ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 159-69, 225-28 (1985).
44. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 6 (1988). In this article, Judge Breyer constructs a hypothetical
sentencing decision, composed of seven distinct steps, illustrating the complexity of the guidelines. He
asserts that the guidelines embody a series of interrelated compromises fundamental to criminal justice
administration that must be understood as a whole to either critique or alter them.
45. FCSC REPORT, supra note 10, at 135-43; Michael Tonry, The Politics and Processes of Sentencing
Commissions, 37 CRIME & DELNQ. 307, 310 (1991).
In fairness to the Commission, Congress has greatly complicated its task. During the same period in
which the guidelines were being developed, Congress spawned an array of federal mandatory penalty laws.
See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 4, app. A (listing approximately 100 separate
federal mandatory minimum penalty provisions found in 60 different criminal statutes). When contrasted
with the studied deliberation that preceded congressional enactment of the SRA, the congressional effort
to create mandatory minimums appears significantly deficient in its methods. Inspired by the outcry over
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process that is less representative, open, and responsive than the procedures by
which states undertook similar reforms. 6 Considering the vital public interests
at stake in federal sentencing, the Commission's guidelines development process
has been unjustifiably less consultative than the processes by which the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure were adopted half a century ago, and
by which those rules have been amended ever since.47
C. Questions for Study
At this juncture, more than seven years after enactment and with much
feedback on the guidelines already in hand, an assessment of the SRA should
confront several basic questions: Has the Commission accurately perceived the
complexity of the sentencing process? In carrying out the research task assigned
it by Congress, has the Commission adequately considered the common law
principles, purposes, and ideas of justice that judges applied prior to the
guidelines? Have sentencing judges and the courts of appeals applied adminis-
trative law principles to test the Commission's guidelines against the limitations
contained in its enabling statute? Have the guidelines narrowed the discretion
of trial judges too far? What assumptions are courts of appeals making about
the quiet processes of negotiated dispositions and waivers of appeal, and their
impact on disparity in sentencing? Do members of Congress think about the
sentencing reform statute when they consider proposals for mandatory penal-
ties? Are sentences today less disparate and more respected than in the pre-
guidelines era?
D. Sources of Information
There is a substantial volume of data and comment to consult for answers.
As of January 1992, federal district courts had imposed more than 92,000
sentences under the Commission's guidelines.' Courts of appeals have already
society's inability to control drug trafficking and drug violence, these laws form the base upon which
mandatory sentences were imposed in nearly 60,000 cases between 1984 and 1990. See id. at 10. The
process has produced indiscriminately harsh legislative penalties for drug kingpins and minor couriers alike.
Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates
Culpability, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 63 (1990); see also Broderick & Wolf Statement, supra note 10, at
279.
46. See PARENT, supra note 7, at 45-48.
47. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074 (1988) (allowing for Judicial Conference input into process of adopting
federal rules of court). For discussion of the lack of opportunity for judges to influence the Commission,
see Broderick Letter, supra note 10; Broderick & Wolf Statement, supra note 10; Testimony of Judges
Vincent L. Broderick and Mark L. Wolf on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States before
the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Feb. 25, 1992), in 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. (forthcoming Mar.-Apr. 1992)
(manuscript at 10, on file with author) [hereinafter Broderick & Wolf Testimony].
48. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Appropriations 2 (Feb. 25, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
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reviewed several thousand cases.4 9 The Commission's annual reports for 1989
and 1990 carefully describe the opening years of the guidelines in operation.5"
In 1991, the Commission published two more reports: a massive study of the
operation of mandatory minimum penalties in the federal system,51 and the
four-year impact report required by section 236 of the SRA 2
Within the past two years, other studies and scholarly articles have exam-
ined the guidelines from a variety of perspectives. These include the April 1990
Report of the Federal Courts Study Comnittee' 3 one Commissioner's co-
authored examinations of plea bargaining under guidelines before 4 and af-
ter5 the Mistretta decision,56 a circuit judge's study of guidelines disparity
in the Eighth Circuit,5 7 another circuit judge's study of departure jurispru-
dence,58 an analysis of "excessive aggregation" under the guidelines,5 9 a
comprehensive examination of the Commission's work in the framework of
administrative law principles,60 and Commission staff reports containing
empirical and legal analyses of discrete issues in guidelines administration. 61
The General Accounting Office (GAO) will soon complete a study, required
by Congress, to determine the impact of the guidelines and to "compare the
guidelines system with the operation of the previous sentencing and parole
49. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 4
FED. SENTENcING REP. 161, 164 n.2 (1991); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations
of the U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 334 (1990) (between 1988 and 1989, criminal appeals rose by
almost 2000 cases, or 31%, to 8399, mostly attributable to the sentencing guidelines).
50. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ANNUAL REPORT];
1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15.
51. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 4.
52. U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2.
53. FCSC REPORT, supra note 10, at 133-44.
54. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 17; see also Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Plea Bargained
Sentences, Disparity and "Guideline Justice," 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 175 (1990); Milton Heumann, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Negotiated Justice, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 223 (1991); Stephen 3.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Bargaining under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 218 (1990).
55. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 2; see also Schulhofer, supra note 2.
56. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of Commission).
57. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Sentencing Guidelines: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 161 (1991); cf. William W, Wrlkins, Jr., Observations on Judge Heaney's Study, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 145 (1991) (criticizing Judge Heaney's analysis of federal sentencing guidelines).
58. Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1991). Judge Selya sits on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit.
59. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U.
CHi. L. REv. 901 (1991) (extended version of Alschuler, supra note 49); see also Morris E. Lasker &
Katherine Oberlies, The Medium or the Message? A Review of Alschuler's Theory of Why the Sentencing
Guidelines Have Failed, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 166 (1991).
60. Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal
Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1991); see also Samuel J. Buffone, Control of Arbitrary
Sentencing Guidelines: Is Administrative Law the Answer?, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 137 (1991).
61. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AcCEPTANCE OF REsPONSIBILTY WORKING GROUP REPORT
(1991); see also Thomas W. Hutchison, The Bank Robbery Working Group Report, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 155 (1991); Ronald Weich, Proposed 1992 Guideline Amendments, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 239
(1992).
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release system. 6 2 Under the SRA, Congress must then conduct an evaluation
to determine: (1) whether the guidelines system has been effective; (2) whether
any changes should be made; and (3) whether the parole system should be
reinstated in some form and the life of the Parole Commission extended.63 As
Congress prepares to assess the legacy of its 1984 legislation, it seems particu-
larly appropriate to make a parallel inquiry.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF GUIDELINE DECISIONMAKING
The federal sentencing guidelines operate on four sequential levels: policy-
making, rulemaking, sentencing, and reviewing. On each level, the system is
more complicated than it was in the pre-guidelines era. Before examining the
levels in detail, this part introduces them and describes their interrelationships.
A. Policymaking
Guiding discretion in systems of discretionary justice is not a new idea.('
Especially when research shows wide variations in practice, few objections to
providing decisionmakers with guideposts or benchmarks should exist. Guidance
can identify starting points, in the form of numbers or ranges, as well as
principles that articulate or modify past judicial practices. Guidance can struc-
ture accurate factfinding because reliable facts will bear a more direct and
predictable relationship to sentences in the future than in the unguided past.65
Guidance can also spur better representation by encouraging defense and
government attorneys to focus on the ultimate disposition of the case from the
outset, rather than deferring sentencing concerns until after conviction.
Many forms of guidance exist. Legislatures guide sentencers when they
enact minimum and maximum sentences, establish ranges for sentencing
discretion, fix mandatory penalties, or establish presumptive sentences. District
judges can set useful precedents when they write opinions explaining sentenc-
es,6 as appellate courts do when they articulate guiding principles or provide
reasons for affirming, reversing, or modifying sentences. Some courts have
developed voluntary guidelines67 or benchmarks. 68 The District of Columbia
62. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 236(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2033 (1984), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 994 note
(1988).
63. Id. § 236(b), 98 Stat. at 2033, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 994 note.
64. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 3-26, 52-96, 215-33 (1969) (discussing
potential for injustice when decisions involve high degree of discretion).
65. Peter B. Pope, Note, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95 YALE
L.J 1258 (1986).
66. For illustrative opinions, see United States v. Murphy, 108 F.R.D. 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); United
States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
67. See Tonry, supra note 45, at 310.
68. See Memorandum from Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second Circuit to District Judges
of the Second Circuit on the Sentencing Benchmarks Project (Dec. 26, 1979) (on file with author).
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Superior Court established its own sentencing commission in the mid-1980's,
and the Superior Court of Delaware has a Sentencing Accountability Commis-
sion, supported by legislation, which structures sentencing discretion using five
levels of punishment, only one of which is prison confinement. 69
When it passed the SRA, Congress envisioned an interactive guidelines
process involving federal judges, the Department of Justice, the Probation
System, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Federal Public Defenders.70 The
Commission would research past practice and consult with sentencing judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers to develop acceptable
norms. Its early guidance would be rudimentary and would evolve over time.
Trial courts, provided with a clearer picture than before of what large numbers
of judges had been doing, would receive starting points and principles. They
would be authorized to individualize sentences and depart from the guidelines
when a case did not fit the guidelines structure, or when Commission guidance
failed to take adequate account of circumstances a court found compelling.
Their statements of reasons would lay the foundation for appellate review. By
reviewing large numbers of cases, courts of appeals would gain a sense of trial
court sentencing practice and the parameters of agreement and disagreement
with the guidelines. The appellate courts would define common law principles
to resolve conflicts.
The Commission would watch this process closely. It would modify or
"fine-tune" its guidelines as individual cases illuminated problems. It would
heed resistance by courts and lawyers and seek cooperative solutions to difficul-
ties created by the new system.
B. Rulemaking
The second level in the guidelines process is rulemaking. Prior to 1984,
Congress was the sole sentencing rulemaker: it defined the crimes and estab-
lished their penalty ranges and procedures. In 1984, Congress established the
U.S. Sentencing Commission and delegated to it the task of guiding judges
within the authorized penalty ranges.7 1 Like Congress, the Commission neither
sees offenders nor decides cases. The Commission is an agency of limited
authority. Section 3553 of title 18 and sections 991 and 994 of title 28 set out
a framework of sentencing factors, policies, inquiries, and guideline prerequi-
sites intended to structure the Commission's work, as well as the procedures
for judges.
69. See Tonry, supra note 45, at 310, 315; NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON
AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 60-63,75-77 (District
of Columbia); id. at 65-68 (Delaware).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1988).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
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The Commission's principal task is to draft and periodically modify
sentencing guidelines. Guidelines are subordinate to the authorizing statute.
They become effective only after complying with the applicable requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act and surviving a six-month period of
congressional oversight and review.
72
The Commission is authorized to promulgate policy statements and com-
mentary.73 Unlike guidelines, policy statements and commentary need not be
published in the Federal Register, submitted to Congress, or delayed for a
waiting period. By themselves, they do not enjoy the force of law, although
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), they are pertinent to a court's assessment of the
adequacy of the Commission's consideration of a guideline.74 Noncompliance
with a policy statement or commentary is not mentioned as a basis for ap-
peal.75
The SRA requires the Commission to develop guidelines based on its study
of past sentencing practice, 76 the purposes of sentencing,77 and advancement
in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. 78
Promulgated under the Commission's title 28 authority, each guideline must
be consistent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, the statutory provisions
that define judicial procedures for sentencing.79
In several important respects, the Commission has not followed Congress'
rulemaking instructions. Indeed, several of the Commission's guidelines and
policy statement rules are inconsistent with the governing statutes. These
include the omission of purpose guidelines, despite 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)
and § 994(f); the prescription of prison sentences for first offenders, despite 28
U.S.C. § 9940); the requirement of a government motion before a defendant
may receive a reduced sentence on substantial assistance grounds, despite 28
U.S.C. § 994(n); and the issuance of application instructions in section lB1.1
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines Manual) that do not
follow the statutory sequence described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (1988) (requiring compliance with Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1988)); 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988) (requiring six-month waiting period). In Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361,393-94 (1989), the Supreme Court relied on the "report and wait" provision to bolster
the constitutionality of the Commission through congressional control.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a)(i)-(2) (1988) (delineating topics for guidelines and policy statements).
74. United States v. Williams, 60 U.S.L.W. 4206 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1992).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (review of sentence); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK
ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 33-34
(1987) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK] (noting that judges need not depart from guideline sentences
even if policy statement recommends departure); infra Part V.B.1 (analyzing the guideline/policy statement
dichotomy). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988) (guidelines to reflect defendant's substantial assistance)
with 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (1988) (policy statements regarding sentence modification).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1988).
77. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 28.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (1988).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
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Rather than holding hearings to examine the growing dismay of judges and
practitioners, Congress has assented to virtually all of the Commission's
guidelines and amendments by silence. Similarly, courts rarely review a guide-
line for compliance with the statute before applying it to a case. These omis-
sions have perpetuated critical flaws in the guidance available to judges, as
discussed more fully below.80
C. Sentencing
The third level in the guidelines system consists of an array of
sentencers--decisionmakers who see the offender in person and help shape
criminal penalties in the case.
In theory, a judge bears sole responsibility for imposing a sentence. In
form, guidelines make no change: the "sentence" remains an order of judgment
imposed by the trial court following conviction and a sentencing hearing. In
fact, however, the nature and severity of sentences have long been the products
of discretionary interactions among decisionmakers: a prosecutor, a defense
attorney, a probation officer, a judge, and a correctional authority. Each is
empowered to make a critical determination or recommendation, prior to or
following the judge's formal sentence, to expand, constrain, inform, or modify
the ultimate penalty that the offender will bear.
A legislature or agency that attempts to alter sentencing outcomes by
imposing strict discipline on judges risks disappointment if it fails to consider
these discretionary interactions adequately. Each "sentencer" makes critical
choices affecting the sentence in the particular case, and-ultimately-the level
of disparity in the sentencing system. A sentence emerges not only from the
sequential stages in establishing a sentencing range or modifying it, but from
variations in discretionary actions taken by different individuals who play the
designated roles within each stage.
There are two primary sentencers under the current guidelines system. The
judge is the nominal sentencer in every case and is often the central official
performing that task. But more often than before the guidelines, the prosecutor
shares and often overshadows the judge's function. For present purposes, the
judge and the prosecutor each dominate one of two decisive modes for impos-
ing sentences under the guidelines. One mode may be called sentencing "by
the book." The other is sentencing "by the bargain."
The judge sentences "by the book." He imposes sentences in the traditional
manner, after following the guidelines and making pivotal determinations of
fact. His role is especially salient in posttrial sentencing, although in many
guilty-plea cases the judge remains the dominant sentencer. The prosecutor, on
80. See infra Part I.C2.a (probation); Part I .C.2.b (purposes); Part II.C.2.c (substantial assistance);
Part VLB.l.b. (statutory sequence).
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the other hand, sentences "by the bargain." She, sometimes after consulting with
the defense lawyer, determines the charges and often the facts in a plea bargain.
These bargains may set unusually tight parameters for judicial sentencing under
the guidelines.
The "book" and the "bargain" both differ from pre-guidelines methods. The
judge's "book" now includes, in addition to the United States Code, the Guide-
lines Manual, which the Commission amends each year. The Guidelines
Manual is a code of changing regulations that substantially constrain the wide
ranges within which judges formerly exercised discretion. It prescribes a starting
point for each case, rules for determining criminal history and for adjusting
sentences upward and downward, tight ranges for each sentence unless the
judge finds a basis for departure, and a sequence for carrying out these steps."1
Displacing much of the discretion available in the past, the Guidelines
Manual, together with the underlying statute, holds the judge accountable for
every sentencing choice. He must state reasons for each sentence,82 including
a "specific reason" for some sentences, 8 and his decision is subject to appel-
late scrutiny.84
Plea bargains in the age of guidelines add significantly to the prosecutor's
traditional power over charging and guilty pleas. The guidelines do not explicit-
ly confer new power on the prosecutor, nor do they, in a technical sense,
"transfer" power from the judge to the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA). But
to the extent that the guideline parameters diminish the power of the judge, they
correspondingly enhance the power of the prosecutor.85
Guidelines are administrative handcuffs that are applied to judges and no
one else. When an AUSA negotiates a disposition by setting or reducing
charges and identifying relevant facts, she effectively restricts the judge's
sentencing range and, consequently, the ambit within which upward and
downward adjustments can make a difference. The judge in this sense becomes
a handcuffed decisionmaker, rather than the "black box" sentencer of the past
who was free to roam at will throughout the statutory range.86 The judge's
sentencing range is now tethered to the prosecutor's choice of charges and facts,
unless the probation officer's independent inquiry brings some facts into
81. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § lBI.1.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (requiring "specific reason" for sentence outside of the Commission's
sentencing range).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
85. See Natali, supra note 10, at 103 ("The main intent of these [plea] bargains ... was to subvert
the impact of the guidelines and, since it appeared that the judge had little discretion to individualize
sentencing, this function was taken over by lawyers."); Saul M. Pilchen, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and Undercover Sting Operations: A Defense Perspective, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 115, 115 (1991) (in
cases involving undercover sting operations, the guidelines "have reduced judicial discretion in sentencing
and increased prosecutorial control.").
86. Cf. Heumann, supra note 54, at 225 (noting that guidelines "dramatically limit judicial sentencing
discretion"). Because the sentencing judge did not have to proffer reasons, he was often referred to as a
"black box" sentencer.
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question. Only when the prosecutor and judge see eye to eye does the close
correlation between AUSA charges and facts and the judge's sentence not
distort the outcome. If they do not agree, however, disparity may be introduced.
Congress clearly intended to structure and narrow judicial discretion by
developing guidelines. But comparatively few commentators anticipated the
extent to which enhanced prosecutorial power would fill the judicial vacuum
created by the guidelines. The resulting impact of the guidelines on the dynam-
ics of federal sentencing, discussed in Part IV below, far exceeds most predic-
tions.
D. Reviewing
The fourth level in the guidelines system consists of two types of review:
sentence review and guideline review. Courts of appeals review sentences on
a regular basis.87 And district courts as well as courts of appeals have the
power to review guidelines.
Jurisdiction to review sentences in the courts of appeals is new under the
SRA. 88 Each court of appeals has concurrent review responsibilities: it hears
appeals from individual sentences in order to determine their conformity to the
guidelines; and, as part of those appeals, it hears challenges to particular
guidelines to assure that they conform to the United States Code.
Both the defendant and the government can appeal a sentence.89 The court
of appeals must give due regard to the trial judge's unique opportunity to assess
the credibility of witnesses. The court of appeals must also accept the senten-
cer's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and must accord due
deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts.90 In
terms of chronology, the district court should initially determine the applicable
guideline and compare it with the underlying statute. If the guideline is autho-
rized, and its application to the case makes sense, that inquiry need not be
carried further.
But if the guideline raises a question of "fairness," 91 or sets a penalty
range that seems too low or too high-if it seems either insufficient or "greater
87. The Supreme Court retains ultimate authority to review both sentences and guidelines, but rarely
does so.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988). But see Robert J. Kutak & Michael Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational
Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463,463-71 (1974). Between 1879
and 1891, circuit courts (which became courts of appeals under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891,
26 Stat. 826) had jurisdiction to review all federal criminal sentences, except those involving fines of $300
or less.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a)-(b).
90. Id. § 3742(d). A more intrusive standard of review may undermine the Commission's goals. In
United States v. Wright, Judge Breyer, a former commissioner, noted that "more intensive appellate review
might hinder the Commission's legal power and expressed intention to collect information about how the
district courts apply the Guidelines and to revise them in light of what it learns." 873 F.2d 437, 444 (Ist
Cir. 1989) (applying clearly erroneous standard).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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than necessary"92-- the court may consider a departure. In such cases, the
court's inquiry should focus on whether the Commission adequately considered
the kind or degree of circumstances, aggravating or mitigating, present in the
case. The departure provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) explicitly mandates an
"adequacy" review by instructing the district court to impose a sentence within
the guidelines
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide-
lines that should result in a sentence different from that described. In
determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consid-
eration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
This congressional invitation for judicial review of a guideline's applicability
is a matter of paramount importance. Review is not limited to determining
whether the Commission merely "considered"--i.e., mentioned-a subject.
Rather, the test focuses on the adequacy of the consideration. It holds the
Commission accountable with respect to the quality of the guideline and assures
courts that they need not follow ill-considered limitations on their discretion.
By scrutinizing the three permissible sources-the guidelines, the policy
statements, and the commentary-for indications of how carefully the Commis-
sion considered the substance of the guideline at issue, a district judge fulfills
a basic statutory purpose: to maintain "sufficient flexibility to permit individual-
ized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken
into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices. 93 Unfortu-
nately, such scrutiny is infrequent. Judicial oversight of the Commission has
not been pursued with sufficient diligence with respect to the process of
guideline formulation,94 or to the substantive instructions governing guideline
content.95 As a consequence, the Commission has not been pressed to meet
its burden of justifying those aspects of the guidelines that cause difficulties
in the courts.
Over the past four years, a colleague and I randomly examined judges'
sentencing transcripts and statements of reasons.96 We found that courts rarely
compare a guideline to the text of the SRA. 7 Many judges seem to assume
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
94. The courts have not ensured that the Commission complies with the "research base" requirement
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(2) (1988), 994(o) (1988), the "reasons" requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988),
or the "policy statement/guideline" distinction of 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), (7) (1988).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988); see also infra Parts V.B, VLA.3.
96. Statements of reasons are required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
97. In the early days of the guidelines, the Federal Sentencing Reporter received large numbers of
sentencing statements from judges in all parts of the country. Those statements rarely cited authorities other
than the guidelines and policy statements by themselves. This observation remains largely true today in the
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that the Guidelines Manual fully codifies the law of sentencing and that nothing
can be done about a troublesome guideline unless Congress acts. Principles of
administrative law, which courts usually follow when reviewing agency actions,
seem to be forgotten when judges themselves are called upon to apply question-
able sentencing regulations. 98 It is paradoxical that district judges who are
outspoken critics of the guidelines have been lax in responding to Congress'
invitation to review guideline validity.
It is equally important for the circuit courts to review the guidelines for
conformity to the statute. Searching review is especially appropriate given
Commission policy statements indicating a willingness to revise the guidelines
based on reasoned departures by district courts. 99
Instead of holding the Commission accountable, however, courts of appeals
have concentrated on restricting the discretionary actions of district courts. One
might expect that the difficult transformation of sentencing heralded by the
SRA, the concerns voiced by district judges about the new system's fairness
and rationality, the statutory requirement of appellate deference to district
courts, and the Commission's welcome view of guidelines as an evolutionary
system1°° all would prompt appellate courts to grant greater latitude to trial
court discretion in the early years of the new system. In fact, a number of
circuit courts have adopted surprisingly restrictive standards in reviewing
district court departures. 10 1 Part V describes the adverse impact of these stan-
dards on guideline compliance and sentencing disparity. But before looking at
district and appellate court responses to the guidelines, it is important to
examine the Commission's work.
III. THE COMMISSION AT WORK
This part examines how the Commission interpreted its statutory mandate,
what policy choices it made, and how the system functions in practice as
illustrated by some of the most troublesome guidelines and policy state-
ments.102
unsolicited statements and transcripts we receive from various courts. For two early and striking exceptions
to this statement, see United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), and United States
v. Birchfield, 709 F. Supp. 1064 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
98. Wright, supra note 60; see also Buffone, supra note 60.
99. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch.1, pt. A, intro. 4(b); see a!so Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. at 1122-23 (noting
that judges should depart from guidelines in appropriate cases to aid the Commission in its future revisions).
100. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch.1, pt. A, intro. 4(b) (referring to "progressive changes" in light
of accumulated future judicial sentences).
101. See Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing Reform
Act, 3 FED. SETENCING REP. 235, 237-38 (1991).
102. Note, for example, the Commission's failure to mention or implement 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'s
provision for parsimony ("sufficient, but not greater than necessary"); 28 U.S.C. § 994(g)'s provision for
guidelines "formulated to minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison population will exceed the capacity
of the Federal prisons"; and § 994(j)'s demand that the guidelines "reflect the general appropriateness of
imposing a sentence other than imprisonment" on first offenders who have "not been convicted of a crime
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A. Statutory Instructions
To guide the Commission, Congress set forth principles based on pre-
guidelines federal practice and on Minnesota's pioneering experience with the
nation's first sentencing commission."° A single section, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
captured the elements of contemporary sentencing.0" The goal was an ade-
quate but parsimonious sanction: "a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes" of sentencing. The section directed
the sentencer to begin the inquiry by looking into "the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant."105 These
facts, in turn, would help shape the next step: the sentencer's choice from
among the traditional purposes of sentencing, including proportionate punish-
ment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation106
of violence or an otherwise serious offense."
The federal prison population at last report stood at 165% of capacity. Attorney General William P.
Barr, Remarks to the California District Attorneys Association (Jan. 14, 1992). The Commission offers the
following explanation for providing imprisonment for every first offender, contrary to the explicit statutory
instructions of 28 U.S.C. § 994 (j) (1988):
The Commission's solution to this problem has been to write guidelines that classify as serious
many offenses for which probation previously was frequently given and provide for at least a
short period of imprisonment in such cases. The Commission concluded that the definite prospect
of prison, even though the term may be short, will serve as a significant deterrent, particularly
when compared with pre-guidelines practice where probation, not prison, was the norm.
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pi. A, intro. 4(d). This extraordinary explanation, accompanied by no research
into pre-guidelines probation, recidivism, or deterrence findings, runs contrary both to Congress' instructions
that all purposes of sentencing were to be available to judges and to the findings of the National Academy
of Sciences report, see BLUMSTEIN ET AL, supra note 30.
103. See PARENT, supra note 7. The findings of BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra note 30 (panel created in
response to National Institute of Justice request to National Academy of Sciences), were highly supportive
of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Most states that adopted "presumptive" guidelines
followed the Minnesota model. For a discussion of "presumptive" sentencing guidelines like those of
Minnesota, see Tonry, supra note 45. Minnesota guideline commission staff assisted Oregon in the
development of its guidelines system. See Kathleen Bogan, Oregon's Sanction Units Exchange System for
Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 36 (1991). While Congress attempted to adopt such
a model, the Commission has turned itself and the guidelines into something much different and much less
effective than Minnesota's sentencing scheme. See Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy,
25 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 301, 303 (forthcoming 1992) (contrasting "communicative and functional possibili-
ties of a simple, clear grid" to complexity of federal guidelines' grid, which "makes it difficult to assess
the basic policy choices about offenses and offenders that lead each convicted defendant to one of its
boxes").
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988); see also Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Taking "Purposes" Seriously:
The Neglected Requirement of Guideline Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 295 (1991); Miller, supra
note 28, (manuscript at 27-30, on file with author) (examining § 3553(a) "purposes" requirement with
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § lB1.1, which ignores relevance of purpose in determining a sentence).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Congress also directed the Commission to ensure "sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences," 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988) (setting forth various instructions
regarding offender characteristics). See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)-(e) (1988) (instructing Commission to
consider "relevance" of certain offender characteristics, but cautioning against considering them for prison
sentences). The wording of these sections has caused some confusion in the courts, see infra Part NI.C.3.
The Senate report accompanying the SRA provides guidance to commissioners and judges for preserving
sentencing flexibility. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 161, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 991).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
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Next, the statute directed attention to the "kinds of sentences avail-
able":"' 7 prison, probation, fines, and restitution. 1 8 At this point, with facts,
purposes, and options clearly in mind, the sentencer was instructed to turn to
"the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines" and any pertinent policy statement"' 9 The section
concluded with an admonition to consider two specific needs: "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct" and "the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense."110
Section 3553(b) clarified the court's authority to assess the adequacy of the
guidelines and to depart from the guideline range when necessary. To make the
process visible, to explain its departures, and to facilitate appeals, § 3553(c)
directed the sentencing judge to state in open court the reasons for his or her
sentence. If the sentence differed in kind or degree from that prescribed in the
guidelines, the court was to state "the specific reason for the imposition of a
sentence different from that described." '
The title 28 sections establishing the Commission incorporated additional
principles. These principles include the general appropriateness of not imprison-
ing first offenders, of imposing a prison term on persons convicted of vio-
lent crimes resulting in serious bodily injury,113 and the general inappropriate-
ness of imprisonment for rehabilitation.114 The statute set forth a preference
for incremental penalties for multiple offenses and a presumption against
consecutive sentences for the crime of conspiring to commit an offense and for
the underlying substantive offense."5 Finally, recognizing the central impor-
tance of capacity constraint to the success of the Minnesota guidelines, the
statute instructed the Commission to "minimize the likelihood that the Federal
prison population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons."'16
107. Id. § 3553(a)(3) (1988).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(l)-(2) (1988). 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1988), sets out the authority for prison,
probation, and fines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (1988), requires restitution to be considered.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988).
110. Id. § 3553(a)(6)-(7).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1988).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 9940) (1988).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 994(k) (1988) ("inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant").
115. Id. § 994(v) (1988) ("limiting consecutive terms of imprisonment for an offense involving a
violation of a general prohibition").
116. Id. § 994(g) (1988); Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2021 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(g)) (suggesting guidelines should be formulated to reduce the chance that federal prison population
not exceed federal prisons capacity); see also PARENT, supra note 7, at 6-7, 40-45, 92-93, 107, 188-92
(describing Minnesota's policy of capacity constraint).
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B. Policy Choices
The Commission inaugurated its guidelines in 1987 by articulating a
number of thoughtful policy decisions. In a wide-ranging and well-reasoned
introduction to the Guidelines Manual, it directed courts to view guidelines "as
carving out a 'heartland"' of typical cases. 17 Judges, the Commission ex-
plained, could depart in unusual or aberrant cases, or when aggravating or
mitigating circumstances required sentences more or less severe than the
applicable guideline range. This departure policy generously allowed a sentencer
to decide when the guidelines did not fit the needs of a case: "The controlling
decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted can only be
made by the courts."118 The policy statement identified a number of factors
"that the Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulat-
ing the guidelines," and noted that any case might involve factors that "have
not been given adequate consideration by the Commission."' 19
The Commission also set out an "evolutionary" philosophy that portrayed
the early guidelines as the beginning of a long process of trial and error-of
adjustment in response to feedback from courts. The Commission seemed to
have adopted a flexible approach to a difficult area of law, committing itself
to continuing dialogue with the judiciary. 20
C. Guidelines in Action
The appealing introduction to the 1987 Guidelines Manual has been
overwhelmed by the complexity, rigidity, severity, uniformity, and dispropor-
tionality of the guidelines and sentences that followed.12 ' Problems appeared
on many levels; this discussion illustrates a few. Published studies, reports, and
cases, from the Commission as well as its critics,122 tell the basic story. Con-
versations and correspondence with federal judges, prosecutors, federal defend-
ers, and probation officers over the past five years illuminate data reported by
others.
2 3
117. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 4(b).
118. Id. § 5K2.0.
119. Id.
120. One troublesome policy choice relating to the purposes of sentencing is discussed infra Part
UI.C.2.b. See also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A; Miller, supra note 28.
121. Judges and practicing attorneys expressed strong vocal opposition to the guidelines in the summer
of 1987. See, e.g., Ad Hoe Sentencing Study Group, Assessing the Guidelines of the United States
Sentencing Commission (1987) (unpublished report, on file with author); FCSC REPORT, supra note 10.
For a critique of the intricacy and complexity of the guidelines, see Miller, supra note 103, at 322-23.
122. See, e.g., The Sentencing Commission and Its Critics, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 205-52 (1990)
(collection of commentary on the work of the Commission).
123. This dialogue culminated in the Sentencing Institute for the Second and Eighth Circuits in
Lexington, Kentucky, on March 1-4, 1992. In addition to several members of the Commission, a host of
federal judges, practitioners, and scholars attended this conference.
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1. Disproportionality
An essential component of solving the problem of unwarranted disparity
lies in distinguishing between like cases, which ought to be sentenced similarly,
and unlike cases, which ought to be sentenced in proportion to their greater or
lesser seriousness.1 4 The Commission acknowledged this problem in its origi-
nal Guidelines Manual by distinguishing between "uniformity" and "proportion-
ality,"'" but it did not adequately address the proportionality issue. One Com-
missioner candidly acknowledged this deficiency in a 1990 law review arti-
cle; 126 the December 1991 Impact Report discussed it briefly and found "no
completely satisfying solution."' 27
The Commission's theory of proportionality is that cases falling in the
higher ranges of its mathematical matrix are uniformly more serious than those
in the lower ranges. But in the real world of sentencing, cases do not "fall" by
themselves. People evaluate them. Judges, prosecutors, and probation officers
confront large numbers of cases each year. They deal with thousands of cases
as they accumulate experience over the course of maturing careers. Examining
each case individually, they learn to distinguish between serious-sounding
crimes that are relatively minorlas and serious crimes that are gravely danger-
ous. They come to recognize relatively minor crimes that involve exceptionally
culpable or high-risk offenders,129 and crimes so marginal that prosecutors
decline to file charges or dismiss them, or judges enter pretrial diversion orders
to avoid the usual adjudication process.13
Many cases are difficult to capture on a sentencing grid. The guidelines
provide for adjustments on seemingly sound grounds,3 but the arithmetic
124. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1983); see also David Sudnow, Normal Crimes:
Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 259-64 (1965)
(discussing proportionality rules developed around "typical" or "normal" crimes to account for aggravating
and mitigating factors).
125. In a policy statement entitled "The Basic Approach," the Commission distinguished the two goals:
"Second, Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. Third, Congress sought proportionality
in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
differing severity." U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 3.
126. Nagel, supra note 17, at 934-35 ("While every effort was made to treat like offenders alike, less
attention was given in the first set of guidelines, partly because of time constraints, to the possibility of over
or under-defining like offenders.").
127. See U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 16-18.
128. For example, "robbery" covers a large range of behavior, much of it relatively minor (e.g.,
pickpocketing).
129. For example, the notorious gangster Al Capone was convicted of tax evasion. For a discussion
of the Internal Revenue Investigation, see generally FRANK SPIERING, THE MAN WHO GOT CAPONE (1976).
See also United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1118 (3d Cir. 1990) (district court imposed upward
departure sentence 10 times the guideline range because offense circumstances were unusually heinous).
130. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESs: U.S. ATORNEYS Do Nor PROSECUTE
MANY SUSPECTED VIOLATORS OF FEDERAL LAWS, at i (1978).
131. For example, the Guidelines Manual provides for adjustments on the basis of criminal history,
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 4Al.l-4B1.4, substantial assistance to authorities, id. § SK1.1, and role in the
offense, id. §§ 3B1.1-.2.
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of calculating adjustments sometimes produces ridiculous results.132 The
application of the "substantial assistance" adjustment in drug courier cases, for
example, results in serious imbalances by producing unduly severe sentences
for "mules" who know little about the drug syndicates for which they work and
unduly lenient sentences for substantial drug dealers who tell all after their
arrest by DEA agents.133
Too often, the Commission's remedy for disparity is uniformity or, in
Albert Alschuler's term, "aggregation," meaning "the treatment of many cases
all at once.' ' "M In its overriding quest to forestall disparity, the Commission
tends to apply the same measuring rods to persons of widely varying culpabili-
ty, frequently leading to bizarre results like those illustrated in Alschuler's
essay. 135
But the SRA did not target sentence "disparity" per se. Instead, it targeted
"unwarranted sentence disparities. 1 36 Disparity is a surface phenomenon. It
raises the question: why are two seemingly similar cases sentenced differently?
When the answer is persuasive in terms of the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the offender, and the purposes of
sentencing, the apparent disparity is in fact warranted. When the disparity
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for, it is unwarranted.
Most serious-sounding cases deserve to be sentenced more severely than
most minor-sounding cases, but the name of the crime only initiates the inquiry.
Each case involves unique offenders and offense circumstances, and their
underlying stories-of need or greed, of recklessness or malice, in mitigation
or aggravation 13 7-- need to be assessed and sentenced by experienced profes-
sionals exercising human judgment. Numerical "offense levels" are useful in
launching the sentencing process, but they are woefully unreliable as substitutes
for judges. A proportionality inquiry ought to begin with the guidelines, but
only judgment calls can credibly confirm or vary proportional sentences. Seven
years after the SRA became law, the Commissioners still have not learned this
lesson.
132. See e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (constructing
hypothetical demonstrating how cases with widely divergent circumstances may require comparable
sentences under the guidelines).
133. See Catharine M. Goodwin, Sentencing Narcotics Cases Where Drug Amount is a Poor Indication
of Relative Culpability, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 226 (1992); Young, supra note 45. On February 19, 1992,
the Ninth Circuit sustained a downward departure to probation for two Mexican drug "mules" in a marijuana
case, on the ground that the relative harmlessness of "mules" was not adequately taken into account by the
guidelines. United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, Nos. 89-10274, 89-10330, 1992 WL 26494 (9th Cir. Feb.
19, 1992).
134. Alschuler, supra note 59, at 904; see also Schulhofer, supra note 2.
135. Alschuler, supra note 59; see also Goodwin, supra note 133; Young, supra note 45.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988) (citing "need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records"); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988) (same).
137. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81-123.
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2. The Appropriate Level of Severity
In enacting the SRA, Congress clearly sought to increase the level of
imprisonment for certain crimes. It identified those crimes in § 994, instructing
the Commission, for example, to specify prison terms "at or near the maxi-
mum" for career offenders who commit crimes of violence or drug offenses,
and to assure "substantial" terms of imprisonment for other designated
crimes."' At the same time, however, Congress also sought to reduce unnec-
essary imprisonment in other kinds of cases. First offenders were one explicit
illustration;139 others were persons in need of rehabilitation or training,14°
and those who provided substantial assistance in the investigation of
crimes. 14' This section discusses four areas in which Commission guidance
affecting sentence severity is flawed: probation, purposes, substantial assistance,
and relevant conduct.
a. Probation
Prior to the SRA, the prison to probation ratio in federal criminal sentenc-
ing was about sixty to forty.142 Congress said nothing in the statute about
abolishing or even drastically curtailing probation. It provided extensively for
probation sentences in §§ 3561-3565 of title 18 and made all offenders up
through class C-felony offenders eligible for probation. 143 The Commission,
however, drafted guidelines containing a presumptive sentence of imprisonment
for every felony in the United States Code. Near the bottom of the scale of
crimes, it established several ranges in which a court could select either prison
or probation. Because courts of appeals regularly decline to review sentences
falling within the correct guideline range, 44 and regularly refuse to review
failures to depart from a guideline,145 no appeal is available if a judge rejects
138. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)-(i) (1988).
139. See, e.g., id. § 9940) (1988) ('The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the general
appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first
offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense... ').
140. Id. § 994(k) (1988) ("inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant").
141. Id. § 994(n) (1988) (authorizing imposition of "lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed,
including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into
account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense").
142. Broderick & Wolf Testimony, supra note 47.
143. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559, 3561, 3581 (1988). The effect of these provisions is to make any person
convicted of a federal offense carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 25 years eligible for
probation, unless probation has been expressly precluded by law.
144. See David Yellen, Should Judges Take Seriously the Sentencing Commission's Standards for
Accepting Plea Agreements?, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 216, 216 (1991).
145. See infra Part V.B.3.b. Some appellate courts will review a failure to depart if the trial judge was
unaware of his right to consider a departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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probation. The result is that the incidence of probation since the guidelines has
been cut by more than half.'
A penal system that employs an effective spectrum of intermediate punish-
ments could rationally decide to limit both prison and probation.147 It could
insert intermediate sanctions such as community service, home confinement,
work release, day fines, restitution, and split sentences on the spectrum between
straight probation for some offenders and longer terms for the violent, danger-
ous, or otherwise grave offenders for whom "just deserts" or public protection
demands extended imprisonment.148 This, however, is not the policy choice
articulated in the Commission's Guidelines Manual.
Instead, the opening policy statement explains that its "solution" to the
probation problem
has been to write guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for
which probation was previously given and provide for at least a short
period of imprisonment in such cases. The Commission concluded that
the definite prospect of prison, even though the term may be short, will
serve as a significant deterrent, particularly when compared with pre-
guidelines practice where probation, not prison, was the norm.'4 9
Nowhere in the Guidelines Manual did the Commission identify the
research that led it to conclude that prior federal probation practice had been
ineffective, or that prescribing prison terms for those who would have received
probation would "serve as a significant deterrent." Deterrence literature raises
significant doubts about the capacity of a penalty structure to deter crime in
situations where would-be offenders do not believe that the probability of
detection, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and sentence is significant.' 50 Re-
search suggests that deterrence makes the most sense in situations where the
likelihood of apprehension and punishment is high, or where the targeted
population fears the prospective penalty and conforms its conduct according-
ly."' The Commission might well have shown the applicability of these
principles to some crimes and some types of offenders. By instead eliminating
146. 1990 ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 15, tbl. C-4. For "type of guideline sentences imposed,"
"probation only" constituted 15.5%, while prison, split sentences, and "probation with confinement" totaled
84%. Id.
147. See generally MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 69, at 9-33.
148. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 9, at 66-76.
149. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 4(d).
150. See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Purposes in England, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 337,338 (1991)
("For the vast majority of crimes, increasing the sentence level in the hope of deterring others has little effect
because of... the belief that the risk of detection is low.").
151. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 158-72 (1973) (describing
various studies and arguing "applicability" and "credibility" of threat are key determinants of deterrence);
see also United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498-99 (1976) (describing when deterrence is an
appropriate purpose of sentencing); cf. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 74-75 (David
Young ed., Hacket Publishing Co. 1986) (1764) (to prevent crime, laws must be clear, simple, and enforced
consistently throughout the nation).
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or curtailing probation indiscriminately, it shirked its responsibility to demon-
strate the nexus between its unprecedented penal policy and knowledge about
crime and justice.
b. Purposes
The SRA's most prominently featured element of sentencing in individual
cases is the "purposes of sentencing." After enumerating them in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), Congress referred to purposes seventeen times in the course of its
instructions to the Commission and the courts. 52
These statutory references are not written as a congressional preamble to
the general question of why society punishes convicted offenders, a matter that
has divided philosophers and criminologists for centuries. Rather, they are
written to delegate the purpose decision to individual sentencers, subject to the
Commission's informed guidance. They identify a case-specific determination
each judge must make when sentencing an individual offender: which congres-
sional purpose shall I serve by my sentence in this case? This is a question to
which the Commission should give guidance in the future, but to date it has
failed to do so.
The Commission misconstrued the purpose provisions of the statute,
attempting unsuccessfully to identify a single purpose to cover all cases. It
discusses this attempt in the Introduction to its Guidelines Manual. "A philo-
sophical problem arose," it explained, "when the Commission attempted to
reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment.', 153
It then discussed two "purposes," crime control and just deserts, saying that
adherents of each had urged it to choose between them. The Commission
declined to choose between them:
As a practical matter ... this choice was unnecessary because in most
sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will produce
the same or similar results. 154
As a matter of law, however, the Commission was wrong. Discerning the
appropriate purpose of sentencing has often been a critical decision for choosing
between widely varying sentences. Judges select purposes quite differently with
152. See Freed & Miller, supra note 104, at 297 (noting that "purposes of sentencing" were to play
"central role" in formulating individual sentences and in drafting guidelines); Miller, supra note 28.
153. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 3.
154. Id. The Commission overlooked the fact, for example, that crime may be controlled either by
rehabilitating an offender or by incapacitating him. Ordering an addict into a community drug rehabilitation
program or imprisoning him for 10 years may equally reduce crime, but they are not considered similar
sentences in the real world.
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respect to different crimes and different types of offenders. 5 5 Kenneth Fein-
berg, who as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee was a primary
author of the legislation creating the Commission, recently observed:
A strong argument can be made that, by ignoring the Congressional
mandate to consider purposes, the Commission has failed to consider
variables very relevant to the individually tailored sentence. In the
absence of more explicit language from the Commission detailing the
consideration given criminal justice purposes, courts would appear to
be free to cite the abdication of Commission responsibility in this
area. 1
56
The Commission's decision to adopt an empirical approach effectively
homogenized all cases at the sentencing stage. This decision is reflected in the
Commission's omission of "purpose" from section lB1.1, the "Application
Instructions." Instead of providing guidance, the Commission by default leaves
to each individual judge the twin duty: (1) to identify a purpose or set of
purposes in each case, according to the judge's own standard or to ones devel-
oped by appellate courts; and (2) to fashion a sentence to promote those
purposes.
The Commission's omission in no way invalidates the guidelines. It simply
leaves to the courts the unguided task of carrying out Congress's purpose
instructions in § 3553(a)(2). For example, a judge confronted by an offender
who has committed a series of crimes of violence might invoke the key provi-
sion in § 3553(a)(2)(C)--"to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant"--to impose a longer prison sentence than prescribed by the applica-
ble guideline.
Such a "departure" under § 3553(b) must be based on the Commission's
inadequate consideration of the kind or degree of offender characteristics
present in the case. A statement of reasons must explain how the offender's
characteristics add up to a profile of dangerousness that goes beyond that of
the typical person convicted of the same crime, and that requires an extended
period of incapacitation in prison. By departing in this example, the judge might
conclude that the Commission underestimated the incapacitative purpose of
public protection to the degree needed in this case when it established its
"heartland" range for the crime category.
In a separate case, the sentencing hearing might lead the judge to conclude
that the missing element of purpose in the "Application Instructions," coupled
155. See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 929 F.2d 629, 632 (11th Cir.) (magnitude of upward departure
was "appropriate and even necessary to insure respect for the law and, more specifically, to see that our
system of punishment retains its deterrent effect."); United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1990) (stating that primary purpose of sentencing is punishment but defendant's rehabilitative potential may
be mitigating factor); Freed & Miller, supra note 104; Miller, supra note 28, at 33-37.
156. Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Guidelines and the Underlying Purposes of Sentencing, 3 FED.
SENTENcrING REP. 326, 328 (1991).
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with the "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" criminal penalty standard
set forth by Congress in § 3553(a), requires a sentence below the prison range.
The judge might find that because the defendant, for whose crime the guideline
sentence is imprisonment, possesses an unusual combination of characteristics
clearly demonstrating that incapacitation is unnecessary, that the offender poses
no danger to the public, and that deterrence, just punishment, and medical
rehabilitation-pursuant to purpose subsections (A), (B), and (D) of
§ 3553(a)(2)-can best be served by a probation sentence conditioned on
placement in a designated residential drug treatment facility, followed by home
confinement, community service and a fine.1 57
Until the Commission acts to provide reasonable guidance with respect to
the purposes of sentencing, judges will remain obligated to implement the
purposes of § 3553(a)(2) on their own.
c. Substantial Assistance
A major escape route from the inflexibility of guideline sentences lies in
the statutory and Commission provisions for substantial assistance discounts
to offenders who aid in the investigation or prosecution of others. 158 Policy
statement 5Kl.1 authorizes a downward departure of unlimited magnitude by
a court on motion of the Assistant United States Attorney. This single policy
statement covers two different kinds of substantial assistance situations.
First, in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), Congress expressly authorizes courts to
sentence offenders below the minimum penalty in a mandatory sentencing
statute, if the government files a motion to that effect.5 9 Section 5Kl.1
faithfully carries out that statutory instruction. Second, in 28 U.S.C. § 994(n),
Congress instructs the Commission to assure that the guidelines reflect the
"general appropriateness" of a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed
where the defendant rendered substantial assistance "in the investigation or
prosecution of another person."' 6 Unlike § 3553(e), this provision is not
limited to mandatory penalty cases and does not condition a reduced sentence
on a prior government motion. The Commission has not complied with this
instruction.
Rather than drafting a "guideline," the Commission wrote a "policy state-
ment." Entirely on its own prerogative, it inserted the requirement of a govern-
ment motion as a prerequisite to a judicial decision to reduce a nonmandatory
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Richard S. Frase, Defendant Amenability to Treatment or Probation as a Basis for Departure Under the
Minnesota and Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 328 (1991).
158. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988).
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sentence. The Guidelines Manual does not explain either of these unauthorized
deviations from the statutory instructions.
In 1990, the Commission wrote an introduction to chapter seven of the
Guidelines Manual, defining for the first time its conception of the difference
between guidelines and policy statements. Written in connection with probation
revocation, it stated:
At the outset, the Commission faced a choice between promulgating
guidelines or issuing advisory policy statements for the revocation of
probation and supervised release. After considered debate and input
from judges, probation officers, and prosecuting and defense attorneys,
the Commission decided, for a variety of reasons, initially to issue
policy statements. Not only was the policy statement option expressly
authorized by statute, but this approach provided greater flexibility to
both the Commission and the courts. Unlike guidelines, policy state-
ments are not subject to the May 1 statutory deadline for submission
to Congress, and the Commission believed that it would benefit from
the additional time to consider complex issues relating to revocation
guidelines provided by the policy statement option. Moreover, the
Commission anticipates that, because of its greater flexibility, the
policy statement option will provide better opportunities for evaluation
by the courts and the Commission.16'
This statement by the Sentencing Commission is fully consistent with the
way Congress distinguished guidelines from policy statements. However, most
appellate courts have rejected any downward departure where the defendant
shows substantial assistance in a nonmandatory penalty statute case, but the
government refuses to make a substantial assistance motion. 162 One major
difficulty with vesting exclusive power in the prosecutor to decide whether
defendants are eligible or ineligible for downward departures is that there are
161. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(a) (emphasis added). In United States v. Lee, No.
91-6079, 1992 WL 27639, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 1992), the Tenth Circuit distinguished between the
nonbinding effect of the chapter 7 policy statements and the binding effect of the § 5Kl.1 policy statement
dealing with substantial assistance. It apparently did so in the belief that § 5Kl.1 was derived exclusively
from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which relates to mandatory minimum penalties. Id. The court overlooked the
fact, not necessary to the decision in the Lee case, that § 5K1I. is also derived from 28 U.S.C. § 994(n),
which authorizes neither a prosecutorial motion nor a policy statement, but does require a guideline allowing
substantial assistance departures in cases arising under nonnandatory penalty statutes.
162. Recently, the Commission published a proposed amendment which, if adopted, would change this
policy. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements for Federal Courts:
Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 90, 112 (proposed Jan. 2, 1992). However, during the Sentencing Institute of the
Second and Eighth Circuits on March 1-4, 1992, Commissioner Michael Gelacak expressed the view that
the proposed amendment would not be accepted by the Commission. See supra note 123.
Some courts have distinguished between guidelines and policy statements. See, e.g., Lee, 1992 WL
27639, at *4; United States v. Long, 936 F.2d 482, 483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 662 (1991);
United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655, 657
(10th Cir. 1990). Others, however, have not. See, e.g., United States v. Ayers, 946 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Blackson, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 611 (1991);
United States v. Oliver, 931 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 133 n.6
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991); see also infra Part V.B.1.
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no visible standards to guide the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. Perhaps
as a result of this unguided prosecutorial power to urge or preclude a substantial
assistance departure, the Commission's 1990 annual report discloses very wide
disparity among districts in the award of such departures, from a low of 0%
in, for example, the District of New Hampshire, the District of Puerto Rico,
and the Eastern Districts of Texas and Oklahoma; to highs of 13.3% in the
District of Maine, 15.2% in the District of South Carolina, 22% in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and 24.1% in the Northern District of Oklahoma. 163
During the recent Sentencing Institute of the Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits,164 a number of district judges engaged Commission members in a
plenary session dialogue on the subject of substantial assistance. They observed
that 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) did not authorize a prosecutorial motion requirement
for substantial assistance departures; that section 5K 1.1 reversed prior practice
under which district judges, not U.S. Attorneys, exercised discretion to decide
whether or not to reduce a sentence based on defendant assistance; and that
vesting power over such departures in the unregulated discretion of an AUSA,
a nonneutral party, invited the very disparity that the SRA had sought to
eliminate.
d. Relevant Conduct
The relevant conduct guideline, which has been called the "cornerstone of
the federal sentencing guidelines,"' 65 undertakes the difficult task of guiding
courts on a problem that has long troubled the factfinding process in criminal
sentencing. The question is how far the sentencing judge may go in using
adverse factual information about the crime, and other allegations against the
offender, that have neither been acknowledged by the defendant nor proven in
court beyond a reasonable doubt.166
Prior to guideline sentencing, there were few rules regarding the admissibil-
ity of information at the sentencing stage. In Williams v. New York, 67 decided
in 1949, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court was free to use a wide
array of information about the offender and alleged prior crimes, including
163. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, app. C, tbl. C-5.
164. See supra notes 123, 162.
165. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 496 (1990).
166. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding due process not violated if sentencing
judge considers defendant's prior criminal record without permitting witness confrontation on that subject).
The dissent protested that the judge, in overruling the jury's recommendation of a life sentence and imposing
the death penalty, relied on "a probation report, consisting almost entirely of evidence that would have been
inadmissible at the trial. Some, such as allegation of prior crimes, was irrelevant. Much was incompetent
as hearsay. All was damaging, and none was subject to scrutiny by the defendant." Id. at 253 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
167. Id.
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crimes never previously charged. This system became known as "real offense"
sentencing.
The Williams decision was influenced by two considerations that no longer
govern today. First, in a system without guidelines, any sentence within the
statutory sentencing range was lawful. A judge, moreover, could impose an
authorized sentence without giving reasons as to how it was selected. Informa-
tion about prior crimes did not have to bear any particular relation to the
sentence imposed. An offender with no prior record could receive the maximum
sentence. An offender with several prior convictions or unadjudicated charges
could receive the lowest authorized sentence. Except for issues of constitutional
magnitude, there was no appellate review of sentences in most jurisdictions.
Second, the prevailing philosophy of sentencing in 1949 was rehabilitation. The
Court clearly wished to allow judges to resort to any information available,
assess its relevance and reliability, and apply their own conception of an
appropriate sanction. There was concern that imposing evidentiary rules on
sentencing would exclude information that might otherwise serve a salutary
purpose.
The Minnesota guidelines rejected real offense sentencing and instead
established a conviction offense system on the rationale that due process would
be offended if the government or the court were allowed to use unadjudicated
crime information to enhance a guideline sentence. 168 The U.S. Sentencing
Commission took the opposite position for reasons spelled out in chapter one
of the Guidelines Manual, and elaborated in law review articles by Commis-
sioner Breyer in 1988169 and Chairman Wilkins in 1990.170 They argued
that conviction offense sentencing placed too much power in the hands of the
prosecutor and deprived courts of too much discretion. They reasoned that real
offense sentencing would permit the judge to determine which information was
relevant, whereas conviction offense sentencing would hinge on prosecutorial
decisions as to charges and guilty pleas.'
168. PARENT, supra note 7, at 62-63, 159-61. Parent distinguishes between alleged offense and
conviction offense sentencing. Others, intending the same distinction, call it real offense versus charge
offense sentencing. According to Professor Michael Tonry, every sentencing commission in the United
States, apart from the federal Commission, has opted for a charge offense system. Michael Tonry, Remarks
at the Sentencing Institute for the Second and Eighth Circuits, Lexington, Ky. (Mar. 4, 1992); see also
Michael Tom-y, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the US. Sentencing Commission's "Mandatory
Guidelines," 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 129 (1991).
169. Breyer, supra note 44.
170. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 165; Marc Miller & Ronald Welch, The Relevant Conduct Controver-
sy, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 150 (1989); see also Symposium, The Issue of Relevant Conduct, 2 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 129-60 (1989).
171. Contrasting discussions about the soundness of Ninth Circuit decisions are found in comments
by a prosecutor and a defense attorney who served as guest editors for an issue on "Turmoil Over Relevant
Conduct in the Ninth Circuit." Compare Roger W. Haines, Jr., The Ninth Circuit's Undeclared War on
"Real Offense" Factors and Relevant Conduct, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 191 (1992) with Judy Clarke, The
Real Issue: Fair Plea Bargains, Not Relevant Conduct, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 194 (1992).
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The Commission's solution, embodied in section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines
Manual, was a set of carefully drafted rules that allowed a court to consider
information about certain kinds of alleged misconduct going beyond issues
presented to the jury, acknowledged in the defendant's guilty plea, or stipulated
to under guideline section 1B1.2. The public debate over this section has been
substantial. The Ninth Circuit largely rejected the relevant conduct concept in
a series of 1990-1991 appeals in plea-bargained cases. 72 It and other courts
have embraced relevant conduct for at least some purposes and incorporated
a "preponderance of evidence" standard to assure reliability. 73 Most lawyers,
as well as ordinary citizens unfamiliar with the daily procedures of criminal
law administration, are astonished to learn that a person in this society may be
sentenced to prison on the basis of conduct of which a jury has acquitted him,
or on the basis of charges that did not result in conviction.
The basic conceptual flaw in applying "relevant conduct" following a guilty
plea is that, contrary to the Commission's rationale, it enhances rather than
reduces the power of the prosecutor. Indeed, it allows a prosecutor to increase
an offender's sentence more easily by dropping charges than by bringing them!
The AUSA can secure a guilty plea on a reduced charge, only then to file with
the sentencing judge alleged information that the defendant neither conceded
nor stipulated to in plea negotiations. In jury conviction cases, the "relevant
conduct" standard allows the AUSA to introduce evidence of another crime at
the sentencing stage that was withheld from trial because the AUSA could not
prove it "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Relevant conduct is becoming a central issue in plea negotiations, as
defense attorneys slowly gain awareness of the magnitude of sentence exposure
that a seemingly reduced guilty plea can convey. It is thus becoming a source
of increasingly intense bargaining and compromise when the AUSA does not
wish to go to trial, and the defender wants to limit sentencing exposure. These
compromises provide a significant arena for attorney discretion and presenten-
cing guideline manipulation. They exacerbate discrimination between well-
represented defendants, for whom a careful bargain fixes the parameters for a
predictable sentence, and less fortunate defendants who, inadequately represent-
ed, enter an untutored plea unaware of the relevant conduct consequences that
may follow.
Ironically, the relevant conduct guideline reduces visibility and candor in
sentencing. It signifies that the facts presented to the judge or jury do not place
guideline boundaries on the sentence, and that the rules governing how far
172. See, e.g., United States v. Fine, 946 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Faulkner, 934 F.2d
190 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Castro-Cervantes,
927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1990).
173. United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that application of § 1B1.3 using
preponderance of evidence standard did not deny defendant due process of law); United States v. Guerra,
888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating "preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies the requisite
due process in determining relevant conduct" under guidelines).
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relevant conduct may be stretched are in fact leading sophisticated practitioners
to bargain over how much unadjudicated information will be withheld from the
court.1 74
Whatever one may think of adding "relevant" criminal allegations to
adjudicated criminal conduct at the time of sentencing, the outcome is a disaster
for guidelines that purport to reduce unwarranted disparity. District judges,
prosecutors, defenders, and probation officers are today demonstrating widely
different attitudes and practices respecting relevant conduct within and across
districts. The bottom line, as suggested earlier, is that disparity resulting from
section 1B1.3 is flourishing in the federal courts, and the longer the Commis-
sion hews to its present course, the more courts can be expected to diverge
from that course and disagree among themselves as to its fairness.
3. Offender Characteristics: "Not Ordinarily Relevant"
Perhaps no provisions in the guidelines evoke more dismay from the federal
judiciary, the probation service, and the bar than the policy statements assem-
bled in chapter 5H, entitled "Specific Offender Characteristics." These provi-
sions declare many personal characteristics of an offender to be "not ordinarily
relevant" to sentencing outside the applicable guideline range. 75 As indicated
below, these 5H policy statements squarely conflict with guideline section
1B1.4 and are inconsistent with §§ 3553(a) and 3661 of title 18.
In Congress' title 18 instructions to judges, the first step listed for determin-
ing the particular sentence to impose under § 3553(a)(1) is an inquiry into the
nature and circumstances of the offense and "the history and characteristics of
the offender." And in § 3661, recodifying former § 3557, Congress made it
clear that past practice regarding judicial consideration of personal information
about the defendant was to continue:
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the back-
ground, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
176
In a second set of provisions regarding offender characteristics, in title 28,
Congress set two tasks for the Commission. First, in § 994(d), it instructed the
174. As indicated earlier, the probation officer may call the court's attention to information that appears
to have been stipulated away. In some cases, courts hold hearings to inquire into the reasons why a
stipulation has not included certain information.
175. For discussion of offender characteristics in the SRA's legislative history, see, e.g., S. REP. No.
225, supra note 9, at 168-75, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3351-58. See also Freed & Miller, supra
note 10. In November 1991, the Commission expanded its chapter 5H list of factors "not ordinarily relevant"
to guideline departures "to include military, civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related
contributions; and a record of prior good works." U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988).
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Commission to consider whether eleven enumerated "matters" with respect to
a defendant "have any relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other
incidents of an appropriate sentence, and shall take them into account only to
the extent that they do have relevance., 17 7 The factors listed were (1) age,(2) education, (3) vocational skills, (4) mental'and emotional condition, (5)
physical condition including drug dependence, (6) previous employment record,
(7) family ties and responsibilities, (8) community ties, (9) role in the offense,(10) criminal history, and (11) dependence on criminal activity for a livelihood.
The first eight factors are personal characteristics; the last three are criminal
characteristics of the offender.
Second, in § 994(e), Congress instructed the Commission to assure that the
guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or
the length of such a term,78 "reflect the general inappropriateness of consider-
ing the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and respon-
sibilities, and community ties of the defendant' ' 179 (This listing excludes three
personal characteristics found in § 994(d)-age, mental and emotional condi-
tion, and physical condition.)
Congress' instructions to judges in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and § 3661 seemed
inconsistent on their face with its title 28 instructions to the Commission. In
title 18, Congress made it clear that judges were to be unrestricted in their
consideration of information about the history and characteristics of the offend-
er. On the other hand, in 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) Congress seemed to make the
Commission the assessor of relevance. And 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) declared
Congress' policy that five personal characteristics were "generally inappropri-
ate" in determining prison sentences (but not probation). How can these
provisions be reconciled?
The Guidelines Manual does not recognize or respond to this question.
Nowhere does it face up to the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) that the guide-
lines and policy statements be consistent with all provisions of titles 18 and 28.
In its original guidelines the Commission did not even acknowledge 18 U.S.C.§ 3661. But effective January 15, 1988, the Commission incorporated the
inconsistencies directly into the Guidelines Manual.'80 In compliance with
§ 3661, it promulgated guideline lB1.4, as follows:
In determining the sentence to be imposed within the guideline
range, or whether a departure from the guideline is warranted, the court
177. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988).
178. To interpret this language consistently with the legislative history, one might say that Congress
was enumerating characteristics that connoted a rehabilitative sentencing purpose. Since 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)(1988) instructs the Commission to assure the inappropriateness of imprisoning offenders in order to carry
out the purpose of rehabilitating them, § 994(e) (1988) cautions against using the listed personal characteris-
tics to guide the sentencer toward a prison sentence, or to determine the length of a prison term. It does
not inhibit a court from using the same characteristics to formulate a sentence of probation.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e).
180. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, at 4-5.
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may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise
prohibited by law."'
In its accompanying commentary, the Commission's explanation only
compounded the confusion with the following four statements: (1) that the
guideline "distinguishes between factors that determine the applicable guideline
range (section lB 1.3) and information that a court may consider in imposing
sentence within that range"; (2) that a "court is not precluded from considering
information that the guidelines do not take into account"; (3) that "information
that does not enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing
range may be considered in determining whether and to what extent to depart
from the guidelines"; and (4) that "some policy statements do, however, express
a Commission policy that certain factors should not be considered for any
purpose, or should be considered only for limited purposes."
182
It is difficult to understand why the three judges on the Commission were
willing to abandon past practice and override the offender characteristics
provisions addressed to judges in title 18. Judges everywhere confront the
offender at sentencing, often after observing him in pretrial or trial proceedings.
They read the presentence investigation report to learn about his history and
characteristics. They listen to what the person and his attorney say in mitiga-
tion, and to what the AUSA presents about voluntary disclosure, remorse, or
bad character, about substantial assistance in the prosecution of others, or about
future dangerousness. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, most judges in most
courts sentence by reference to the offender, not just to the crime.
In the end, the Commission chose to acknowledge the relevance only of
a person's criminal characteristics, and tallied them up arithmetically in its
matrix categories I, II, Im, IV, V, and VI. 183 It offered no reasons supporting
its conclusion that the eight enumerated personal characteristics were ordinarily
irrelevant.'" It wrote no commentary to present its research or to weigh the
wisdom and drawbacks of a different policy. The Guidelines Manual's designa-
tion of all chapter 5H material as policy statements symbolizes the uncertainty
of the decision.
18
Perhaps the Commission could not determine how to convert personal
characteristics into point scores in an arithmetically based system. Consistent
181. Id. § lB 1.4 (emphasis added). The Guidelines Manual does not explain the authority for adding
the words "unless otherwise prohibited by law," but it probably refers to the last sentence of 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(d): 'The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as
to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of the offenders."
182. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.4 cmt. (citing chapter 5H).
183. See id. §§ 3B1.L-.2 (role in the offense); id. §§ 4AI.1-.3 (criminal history); id. §§ 4131.1-.4
(criminal livelihood); cf. id. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
184. See Id. §§ 5H1.1-.11 (age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, physical
condition, employment record, family and community ties, are "not ordinarily relevant").
185. See infra Part V.B.1.
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with the flexible and evolutionary spirit of the Introduction to its Guidelines
Manual, it could have encouraged judges to spell out their reasons when they
enhanced or diminished sentences. Assembling such statements for a year or
two would have provided a data base of judicial reasoning. Furthermore,
analysis of the reasons might have enabled the Commission to draft and explain
a less inconsistent, more satisfactory set of policies.186
The Commission's failure to reconcile the inconsistent provisions in the
statute and the inconsistent language in its own Guidelines Manual, and its
inability to affirmatively guide the relevance of personal characteristics, has
troubled the courts.187 As we will see in Part IV, these troublesome rules are
causing turbulence in the probation service and among prosecutors and judges,
producing disparate sentences instead of the reasonable consistency for which
the guideline concept was designed.
IV. DISTRICT COURT SENTENCING: RIGID GUIDELINES IN A
DIsCRETIONARY PROCESS
The guideline development process included much empirical study of
presentence reports written by probation officers, but little research into the
decisionmaking processes of judges and practitioners. Instead of bringing to
light shared principles in the administration of sentencing justice, the Commis-
sion's research failed to sensitize it to the values and norms of the judges for
whom it was about to "legislate." As a result, it is not surprising that the
Guidelines Manual has had an impact on courts quite different from that
intended by the Commission: rather than increasing sentencing visibility and
reducing "unwarranted" disparity, the guidelines have tended to reduce visibility
and to produce "intentional" disparity.'
A brief review of the history of interactions between the Commission and
the federal judiciary in Section A below sets the stage for analysis in Section
B of the reasons for the increasing resistance and persistent disparity five years
after the guidelines began.
186. The Commission wisely acknowledged in its initial Guidelines Manual that it was "difficult to
prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant
to a sentencing decision." U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 4(b). Likewise, it stated that "By
monitoring when courts depart... and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions
with reference thereto, the Commission, over time, will be able to refine the guidelines to specify more
precisely when departures should and should not be permitted." Id.
187. Cf. Freed & Miller, supra note 10, at 235 ('This sense of judicial powerlessness to deviate from
Judicial Branch administrative regulations strikes us as a fundamental error.").
188. U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 114 tbl. 29; see also Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note
17, at 245 (finding that by agreeing to plead guilty to lesser offense severity level, defendants may reduce
amount of time served by 25-35%).
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A. Judicial Reactions to the Commission
District judges sensed very early that the new system would deviate
conceptually from previous sentencing norms. They initially expressed their
opposition in hearings in the fall of 1986, when the Commission began to
receive comment on early drafts.189 When the Commission submitted its third
draft to Congress in April 1987, substantial judicial sentiment favored congres-
sional action to suspend the imposition of guidelines pending full legislative
hearings. Despite widespread support for that view by such groups as the
Judicial Conference of the United States and the American Bar Association,
Congress did not act, and the guidelines became law without legislative modifi-
cation.190
The next stage for protest occurred in the courts. By mid-1988, a number
of lawsuits challenged the guidelines as unconstitutional. Some district courts
held unprecedented en banc hearings to receive arguments from the Department
of Justice and the Commission, both of which supported constitutionality,
though on different theories, and from defense attorneys, who argued that the
Commission and its guidelines were unconstitutional. Within a year, nearly two-
hundred judges had written or concurred in decisions holding the new system
invalid. 91 In January 1989, the Supreme Court, by an eight-to-one vote,
sustained the validity of both the SRA and the Commission in Mistretta v.
United States.
192
Settling the legal issue, however, did not pacify the courts. Experienced
as well as recently appointed judges, liberals and conservatives, and former
prosecutors as well as former private attorneys persisted in criticizing the
Commission and the guidelines. 93 In April 1990 the Federal Courts Study
Committee published its final report, containing a chapter sharply critical of
the guidelines."l It reported that a survey of 270 witnesses found 266 against
and four in favor of the guidelines. The detractors all were judges; the four
189. See, e.g., RegionalPublicHearing Before the United States Sentencing Commission, Denver Co .
211 (1986) (testimony of Chief Judge Clarence Brimmer, D. Wyo.); Regional Public Hearing Before the
United States Sentencing Commission, Chicago, Ill. 118 (1986) (testimony of Judge Michael Mihm, C.D.
Ill.); Regional Public Hearing Before the United States Sentencing Commission, New York, N.Y. 33-34
(1986) (testimony of Judge Jack Weinstein, S.D.N.Y.).
190. The SRA provided that if Congress did not act within six months of the date it received the
Commission's proposed guidelines, those guidelines would become law. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235, 98 Stat.
1987, 2031, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (1988).
191. 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 11 (reporting 200 judges found Commission's guidelines
unconstitutional, while 120 found them constitutional). But see Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that statute establishing Commission violated separation of powers doctrine). The
Ninth Circuit was the only appellate court to find the guidelines unconstitutional.
192. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
193. See, e.g., Post-Mistretta Forum: How Can Guideline Sentencing Be Improved?, I FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 357-76 (1989).
194. FCSC REPORT, supra note 10, at 133-44.
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supporters were three Commissioners and Attorney General Richard Thorn-
burgh.195
The concerns of district judges centered on discrepancies between guideline
concepts and outcomes, on one hand, and contemporary norms of sentencing
and fair process on the other. They objected to the Guidelines Manual's
complexity and to the Commission's effort to micromanage the judiciary. They
spoke as though the third branch had become the victim of a hostile takeover.
Their message was clear, in the press, in judicial conferences, from the bench
at the time of sentencing, and in testimony before the Commission and Con-
gress. 1
96
One might have expected the Commission to respond by reducing the
inflexibility and severity of the guidelines. Instead, its amendment process
rejected virtually all of the judiciary's suggestions.197 Tightening the guide-
lines and adding new amendments every year, the Commission seemed deter-
mined to show how tough an administrative agency can be in the face of
consumer opposition, even when the consumers are Article III judges.
B. Process Responses by Four Sentencers
Outspoken condemnation was not the only professional response to the
guidelines. It soon became clear that a variety of actors, including judges,
retained power and discretion over sentencing that guidelines could not control.
To the extent that judges were constrained, discretion could be exercised by
others.
This section illustrates how judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
probation officers, among others, 198 have reacted in individual cases to funda-
mental alterations in the traditional sentencing process. In an important sense,
each of these professionals exercises sufficient discretion to be considered a
"sentencer."
To understand the actions of these sentencers, the reader should know
something about the range of discretionary decisions various actors can make
under the federal guidelines. Until recently, the Commission described sentences
either as in "compliance" with the guidelines or as explicit "departures" from
195. Id. at 142.
196. See e.g., Cabranes, supra note 10; Public Hearing, supra note 10.
197. See Fred W. Bennett, A Direct Participant's Perspective on the Guideline Amendment Process,3 FED. SENTENCiNG REP. 148 (1990) (discussing amendment process and possible means of improvement);
Thomas W. Hillier III, The Commission's Departure From an Evolutionary Amendment Process, 4 FED.SENTENCING REP. 45 (1991) (criticizing amendment process); cf. Statement of Thomas Hillier on behalf
of Federal Public and Community Defenders, in 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 224 (1990) (criticizing disparity
and unfairness produced by guidelines).
198. The court of appeals is also a "sentencer"; Part V, infra, discusses its role in connection with the
companion duty to serve as a reviewer of guidelines.
1720 [Vol. 101: 1681
HeinOnline -- 101 Yale L.J. 1720 1991-1992
Federal Sentencing
them. ' 99 "Compliance" meant that judges were following the "Application
Instructions" in section 1B1.1 and a host of other provisions to determine the
appropriate sentencing range for an offender. These included:
(1) the chapter 1 guideline on relevant conductm
(2) the chapter 2 base offense calculations and specific offense charac-teristics; 20'
(3) the chapter 3 array of guideline adjustments;20
(4) the chapter 4 criminal history guidelines, and the escape provision
on "adequacy" of criminal history set forth in policy statement
4A1.3;
(5) the chapter 5H and 5K policy statements governing offender
characteristics and departures;2 0 and
(6) the chapter 6 policy statements on plea bargaining.0 5
"Departure" occurred whenever a judge sentenced outside the calculated range,
regardless of the reasons given.
The distinction between compliance and departure was a false dichotomy,
manufactured by the Commission to deter judges from sentencing outside the
prescribed ranges. It understated the considerable opportunities for discretion
available to participants in the sentencing process. It also underestimated the
extent to which two officials, reading the same guidelines in the same case, can
and do interpret the same guidelines differently and impose different "guideline
sentences."' 6 Finally, it failed to capture the distinction between formal
departures and informal action by prosecutors and defense attorneys when they
negotiate guideline avoidance.
1. Probation Officers
Looking more closely at the role each sentencer plays in the application
of guidelines to an offender, the judge usually turns first to the probation
officer. The presentence report, prepared by the probation officer, is expected
to set forth undisputed facts and all guideline calculations. It alerts the judge
199. See 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 2; Tonry, supra note 6 (discussing Commission's
data on compliance rates); Paul K. Martin, Response to Michael Tonry, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 158 (1989).
Judges were outraged by the Commission's characterization, in its 1989 annual report, that departures
represented "noncompliance" with the guidelines. They argued, appropriately, that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1988), and chapter 5K of the Guidelines Manual explicitly authorized departures. In the 1990 annual report,
issued in the summer of 1991, the Commission was careful to avoid repeating its mistake.
200. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B 1.3.
201. Id. §§ 2Al.l-2X5.1.
202. Id. §§ 3Bl.1-3El.1.
203. Id. §§ 4AI.1-4BI.4.
204. Id. §§ 5H1.1-.11, 5Kl.1-5K2.16.
205. Id. §§ 6B1.1-.4.
206. Each chapter in the Guidelines Manual, despite detailed instructions often set forth in mandatory
language, affords wide leeway for different interpretations by each judge, AUSA, defense attorney, and
probation officer.
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to factual disputes between the AUSA and the defense attorney, indicates a
proposed guideline sentence or range, and, optionally, comments on the appro-
priateness of a departure. In addition, the presentence report contains the
probation officer's confidential sentence recommendation.207
Probation officers have been criticized for being "guardians of the guide-
lines" and for taking the government's side in factfinding under the guide-
lines.20 8 They in turn have criticized both the Commission, for excessively
complex and inflexible guidelines, and the courts of appeals, for conflicting and
confusing decisions? 9'
The published views of probation officers demonstrate that no single
opinion dominates the U.S. Probation Service regarding the desirability of the
guidelines.210 Some officers evince pro-law enforcement leanings; others have
pro-social work leanings.21' There are also differing attitudes about the desir-
ability of departures.212 Probation officers often express dissatisfaction with
the extent to which government and defense attorneys stipulate to lesser facts
than a defendant's crimes or relevant conduct warrant. 213 Officers sometimes
are dismayed when judges order them to delete from presentence reports factual
statements that are inconsistent with the sentence imposed.214
The Probation Service has many members who are highly regarded in their
courts for service prior to the guidelines. During those years, probation officers
devoted substantial time to gathering information and gaining insight into the
offender's personal history. They assessed the offender as a whole person,
examining his criminal history, community reputation, childhood, employment
record, adult achievements, substance abuse problems and efforts to break such
habits, and rehabilitative progress. They tried to distinguish between young
offenders bent on building criminal careers and others who seemed about to
turn a comer, settle down, and get a job. They supervised cases in which
probation accompanied by community penalties, such as home confinement,
207. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
208. See Judy Clarke, Ruminations on Restrepo, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 135, 135 (1989) (discussing
whether federal probation officers should continue to have role of interpreting law); Charlie E. Vamon,
Response to Judy Clarke, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 202 (1989) (responding that probation officers have
no discretion in recommending sentences); Judy Clarke, The Sentencing Guidelines: What a Mess, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 45,47. See generally Probation Officers and the Guidelines, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 61-120 (1991).
209. See, e.g., Bill Barrett, Probation Officers and the Beast, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 106, 107-08(1991); Charlie E. Varnon, The Role of the Probation Officer in the Guideline System, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 64-65 (1991).
210. For illustrations of a wide range of probation officer attitudes and role interpretations, see the
collection of essays in Probation Officers and the Guidelines, supra note 208, at 61-120.
211. Id.
212. Tony Garoppolo, Confusion and Distortion in the Federal Sentencing Process, 27 CRM. L. BULL
3 (1991).
213. See, e.g., Natali, supra note 10, at 103 ("Subtle and creative forces began to short-circuit the whole
process of guideline sentencing. Attorneys for the defense and the government found new ways to ply their
old trade with plea bargains... in all shapes and sizes ... stipulations seemed to be fiction writings, when
compared with the known facts of the cases they attempted to address.").
214. See Barrett, supra note 209, at 107; Vamon, supra note 209, at 63-64.
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community service, or drug treatment, worked well, and other cases in which
probationers committed new crimes.
Today, many probation officers and the judges they serve remain confident
of the value of professional judgments and individual insights in controlling
crime and treating offenders. They believe that individual judgments should
continue to play an integral role in the sentencing process. To these profession-
als, boxes in a guidelines matrix cannot substitute for the personal assessments
that probation officers and judges have been making for years.
Many new probation officers, on the other hand, have only come on duty
since the guidelines' implementation. Newcomers often have little tradition to
fall back on. Some are powerfully influenced by Commission training sessions.
Others may be persuaded, by the attitudes of their chiefs, colleagues, or judges,
to use the guidelines flexibly. Loyalties divided between new guideline teach-
ings and older justice system traditions create tensions in the probation service
and suggest one reason, among many, why different officers approach guideline
assignments with different attitudes and arrive at different calculations and
recommendations in similar cases.
Writings, speeches, and personal conversations with probation officers
confirm that the guidelines have given the Probation Service a highly visible
and pivotal role in the formation of sentences. Considerable variation exists in
the ways officers write reports to shape ultimate sentences, and in the extent
to which judges rely on the probation officer or review presentence investiga-
tions and guidelines calculations from scratch. Under such circumstances, the
interaction between probation officer and judicial discretion inevitably creates
countless opportunities for sentence disparity.
2. Prosecutors
Discretionary decisions of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, both as to charges and
as to factual allegations, can powerfully expand or limit the judge's ambit for
sentencing. One key category is "relevant conduct" under guideline lB 1.3. Such
conduct enhances sentences based on information concerning the weight of
drugs, amount of money, or possession of guns. It may also include alleged
criminal conduct or aggravating aspects of crimes of which the defendant
escaped conviction, or which he did not contemplate in his guilty plea. A
prosecutor's options for including or excluding information can drastically
influence the sentence range, and different prosecutors make different decisions
in similar cases.
By adopting "mandatory guidelines" with many of the same attributes found
in mandatory penalty statutes,215 the Commission has provoked the same sorts
of evasion and nullification practices among prosecutors that it detailed it in
215. See Tonry, supra note 168.
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its report on those statutes. 16 If an AUSA sympathetically perceives the judge
as handcuffed in the effort to formulate a proportionate sentence in a low-level
drug or gun case, the AUSA can lend a hand. She may drop a charge, or
stipulate to the probability of a reduced quantity of drugs or an unloaded gun
under the relevant conduct guideline. She may signify an intention not to appeal
if the judge departs downward, or she may make a motion for a substantial
assistance departure to enable the judge to sentence below the guideline range
without fear of reversal." 7
The prosecutor's ability to exercise compensating discretion in these
respects may fall well within the policies of the Department of Justice1" and
the past practices of the justice system. If called to account, the AUSA may,
for example, cite the dubious provability of a larger amount of drugs, a lack
of credible evidence that the gun was loaded with real bullets, or a heavy
caseload of higher priority crimes that would suffer if this minor case were
compelled to go to trial.21 9
Disparity quickly enters into the sentencing process when one AUSA
readily makes these adjustments in prosecuting what, in her district, constitutes
a low-level drug case, while an AUSA in another district, where drug traffick-
ing and selling are rare, may press for the highest penalty range the guidelines
will allow.' Both discretionary actions may comply with Justice Department
guidelines, but the resulting disparity is substantially invisible, largely immune
from criticism, and beyond judicial review.
3. Defense Attorneys
Federal public defenders and private defense attorneys have less formal
power over the disposition of their cases than do prosecutors. The defendant,
not the attorney, makes the decision on plea or trial, on cooperating with the
government, and on whether to appeal the ultimate conviction and sentence.
Nevertheless, the defense attorney plays a key role in resolving the case and
shaping the sentence.
Defense attorneys vary widely in their talents, zeal, understanding of the
guidelines, knowledge of sentencing alternatives, and preparation and advocacy
at sentencing.22' As a result, some defendants have a significantly better
chance than others to lessen their penalty. The better lawyers succeed more
216. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 4.
217. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5Kl.1 (substantial assistance to authorities).
218. See Richard Thomburgh, United States Department of Justice March 13, 1989 Plea Policy for
Federal Prosecutors, 1 FED. SENTENCING REP. 421 (1989).
219. Goodwin, supra note 133; Robert S. Mueller H, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 4 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 230, 231 (1992).
220. See Memorandum from Attorney General William P. Barr to Federal Prosecutors 1 (Jan. 31, 1992)
(on file with author) (describing "Project Triggerlock," in which Attorney General ordered federal prosecu-
tors to seek upward departures in cases involving semiautomatic weapons and/or gang-related crime).
221. U.S.S.C. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 2, tbls. 21-22.
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often in avoiding indictment in the first place, in negotiating a reduction in the
severity and number of charges, in presenting a more effective argument at
sentencing, and in obtaining a less onerous outcome.2
Discrepancies in attorney talent and competence do not constitute disparity
or disproportionality in a legally cognizable sense. So long as defense represen-
tation does not fall to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendants who receive worse sentences are deemed to have gotten
all they deserve.' Still, differences in the quality of representation account
for a substantial share of sentencing variation, both prior to and under the
guidelines.224
To the extent that the guidelines strip judges of sentencing discretion, each
defendant must place a premium on his attorney's ability to negotiate a desir-
able disposition with the prosecutor. Paradoxically, strict appellate enforcement
of the guidelines, creating trial court reluctance to depart downward, often
means that the defense attorney is more likely to achieve a lighter sentence
through bargaining with the AUSA than by proceeding in accordance with the
guidelines.?
4. Judges
Before the judge faces the question of whether to impose the guideline
sentence or to depart, she must first determine what it means to "comply" in
light of the various findings and calculations outlined above. 6 She must
resolve issues identified in the presentence report-the factual and interpretative
questions on which the parties could not agree, or on which the AUSA and the
defender are in accord but the probation officer is not. Next, the judge may
want to know the bottom line, for instance: what sentence will the guidelines
permit if I find that the defendant possessed only forty-nine kilograms of
cocaine, z27 if I rule against the obstruction of justice charge,M or if I
determine that the defendant had a "minimal" rather than "minor" role in the
offense?229 Finally, the judge must make a decision. It may be complicated
222. See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK (1985).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Pregler, 925 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d
1346 (9th Cir. 1990) (erroneous prediction by counsel concerning sentencing does not entitle defendant to
challenge guilty plea).
224. See U.S.S.C. IMPAcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 128-29 (defense counsel are participants least
familiar with guidelines).
225. Letter from Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, D. Colo., to ilene H. Nagel, U.S.
Sentencing Commissioner (Feb. 21, 1990), in 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 229 (1990).
226. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
227. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2D2.1(b)(1) (defendant convicted of possessing more than five grams
of cocaine sentenced according to § 2Dl.l, as if convicted of intending to distribute it); id. § 2DL.1(c)(4)
(between 50 and 150 kilograms of cocaine earns defendant level 36 sentence).
228. Id. § 3CI. (obstruction of justice increases defendant's sentence).
229. Id. § 3B 1.2 (more mitigating to have had "minimal" than "minor" role).
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or comparatively simple, depending on whether she wishes to apply her experi-
enced sense of the "usual" sentence in this sort of case,' 0 or whether she
wishes mechanically to follow the probation officer's guideline calculations.
In many cases, perhaps a majority, the straight guideline sentence falls
within the judge's sense of justice, and there is little problem resolving a
guideline/justice issue. When this is not the case, however, the judge has a
three-way choice:
(1) She may decide to comply with the guidelines in every respect.
She may do so in the belief that the guidelines represent the archi-
tecture of a new system, different and better than the indeterminate
pre-1987 system, and that it is preferable for judges to defer to
uniform rules rather than to try to individualize each sentence. 23
(2) She may decide to challenge the system openly. Biting the bullet,
she may believe that departures are vital to the health of the sys-
tem,sa that all sentencing decisions should be up front, that the
Commission "inadequately considered" the degree to which an
aggravating or mitigating factor is present in this case, and that she
should take time to spell out her reasons for this sentence and not
be concerned about the possibility of reversal on appeal.
(3) She may decide to avoid the formal system. She may choose to
accept the plea negotiated by the parties, z3 despite the probation
officer's disagreement, believing that the parties' result is fairer
than that required by the guidelines. She may take this quiet, less
visible path to preclude reversal or to avoid having to write a
careful statement of reasons or sentencing opinion with an uncer-
tain fate. Or she may decide to depart on the record knowing that
the AUSA and the defendant have agreed to waive appeal, thereby
immunizing the sentence from review?2'
When the gap between a guideline sentence and a just sentence is small,
most judges are likely to choose the first option and follow the guideline, for
the norm of courts is to follow the rules. As the gap between the Commission's
guidelines and a judge's concept of just punishment widens, the degree of
disrespect, noncompliance, and disparity is bound to increase, and the judge
230. The SRA's transformation from an indeterminate system, allowing parole release after defendants
had served one-third (and sometimes less) of a prison sentence, to a determinate system in which defendants
must serve close to the full sentence, requires judges to perform mental arithmetic and parole guesswork
in order to compare a guideline sentence with the "usual" pre-guidelines sentence.
231. See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 16.
232. See, e.g., Vincent L. Broderick, Foreword, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991.
233. William Stafford, Settling Sentencing Facts at the Guilty Plea Hearing: A Time-Saverfor the Trial
Court, 3 FED. SENTENING REP. 214 (1991); see also Nagel& Schulhofer, supra note 2 (manuscript at 82-12
to 82-14) (noting judges complicit in charge-reduction plea agreements, even though guidelines require them
to reject agreements that do not reflect adequately seriousness of actual offense, however, explaining
complicity as resulting from "micro," as opposed to national policy, perspective on sentencing).
234. Cf. Roger W. Haines, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
3 FED. SENTENCiNG REP. 227 (1991) (arguing that exclusion in plea negotiation of right to appeal sentence
is proper).
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may more often choose the second option, formal challenge, or the third option,
informal avoidance. When the gap becomes very wide, more and more deci-
sionmakers-prosecutors, probation officers, and judges?35-will opt for the
just sentence because they are all sworn to do justice. In these situations, still
more discretionary decisions in similar cases will land on the avoidance side
of the guideline versus justice dispute, resulting in greater disparity.
One may question whether this sort of disparity is warranted or "unwarrant-
ed" within the meaning of the SRA. It is both. Those who sense that justice
requires them to avoid an unreasonable guideline sentence in a particular case
are warranted in seeking a just sentence. "Fairness" is a primary goal of the
SRA, 36 and the sentencer who conscientiously believes that the guideline
sentence is unfair might also believe that it is more likely to produce injustice.
But since many sentencers consider the guidelines to be the equivalent of a
statute and thus must be enforced without regard to one's personal view of
justice, the resulting disparity, which the rigid guidelines create, may be
credited to the joint account of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the courts
of appeals.
V. GUIDELINE VALIDITY: THE NEGLECTED APPELLATE ISSUE
The Commission told Congress in February 1992 that more than 92,000
defendants had been sentenced under the guidelines in the three years since
Mistretta237was decided.2s The vast majority of cases, approximately
eighty-eight percent, were resolved by guilty plea, where the parties had
opportunities not present in trial cases to stipulate facts, agree on a sentencing
range, and waive appeal.239 Nonetheless, about 5400 sentences are being
appealed annually.' Since sentences were rarely reviewed before the guide-
lines, this number represents a significant addition to appellate caseloads. More
235. See Jerry D. Denzlinger & David E. Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before and After
Guideline Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 49; Garoppolo, supra note 212; Probation Officers
and the Guidelines, supra note 208, at 61-120 (collection of essays examining the role of probation officer
in guideline sentencing).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
237. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
238. Testimony of William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission, before the House
Subcommittee on Appropriations 2 (Feb. 25, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
239. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, tbl. C-7; Haines, supra note 234.
240. The Federal Judicial Center reported that approximately 5300 sentences were appealed in 1991,
Federal Judicial Center, Type and Number of Criminal Appeals Terminated, and Each Type as a Percentage
of All Terminations (Apr. 1992) (datacompiled from Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Database, transcript
on file with author), and 5400 were appealed in 1990. Federal Judicial Center, Type and Number of Criminal
Appeals Terminated, and Each Type as a Percentage of All Terminations (Apr. 1991) (data compiled from
Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Database, transcript on file with author).
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importantly, like never before, guidelines are compelling appellate judges to
wrestle with the difficult task of sentencing. 4 1
A. The Gap Between Circuit Court and District Court Perspectives
The outcry against the guidelines is less audible in the courts of appeals
than at the trial level. Some appellate judges have forgotten what sentencing
is like in district courts; some may not realize how much change guidelines
have produced; others have never had sentencing experience. Still other judges
with prior criminal trial experience appreciate the intensity of the reaction
below, but view their appellate responsibilities as posing a different set of
challenges.
Appeals court judges are reviewers, opinion writers, and rulemakers. They
no longer look defendants in the eye, study presentence reports, or struggle with
assessing whether an offender is beginning or ending a criminal career, appears
to be dangerous or harmless, is a minnow in a sea of big fish, or has gone
astray under unusually stressful circumstances and will not offend again.
Appellate judges no longer see large numbers of worried or stunned faces, or
multiple defendant cases covering the full range of criminal responsibility. The
appeals court is remote from the universe of cases that make equality and
proportionality in punishment, across different defendants and crimes, issues
of transcendent importance.
Some trial judges view their appellate colleagues as thinking that guidelines
are "written in stone" and that "an act of departure is something which has to
be curbed."'4 2 Some appellate judges, on the other hand, think their district
court colleagues are too emotional about the guidelines and need an objective
reviewer to give the new law of sentencing the bite of authority. They believe
the current turmoil will settle down once appellate review places sensible limits
on trial court departures.' 3
Such thinking is illusory. The courts of appeals have not fully recognized
the remarkable degree to which the new rules deviate from the traditional
system of individualized justice and its ideals. 244 Those who do not actually
sentence may not comprehend the complexity of the prescribed computations
and the bizarre results they can produce. Moreover, the appeals court is insuffi-
ciently exposed to the range of offender differences that the Commission
downplayed when it formulated a point scoring system, involving 258 sentenc-
241. Appellate judges should be careful not to assume that the sentencing appeals they hear are
representative of the typical sentencing case. Sentencing appeals constitute little more than 10% of all
criminal cases, and the great majority of cases sentenced after plea bargaining are not appealed. See supra
note 240.
242. Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 290 (testimony of Judge Vincent L. Broderick).
243. Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 16; Selya & Kipp, supra note 58, at 49.
244. Public Hearing, supra note 10, at 289-90 (testimony of Judge Broderick); Cabranes, supra note
10, at 2.
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ing boxes, and narrowed the routes to individualization and proportionality. This
unfamiliarity with the guidelines, particularly the extent to which they deviate
from pre-guideline principles and practices, has led the courts of appeals to
enforce the guidelines in ways that district court judges find increasingly
intolerable. As a result, the gap between appellate decisions and district judges'
experienced sense of justice is widening.
Looking more closely, how are the courts of appeals approaching their new
sentence review function? Preliminary indications from an ongoing study of
appellate review of departures suggest that courts of appeals reverse or remand
a significant percentage of unguided departure sentences. This is especially true
when the departure is based on offender characteristics.' 5 They have, for
example, rejected departures by ruling that the Commission had adequately
considered the particular aggravating or mitigating circumstance, such as the
pregnancy of a defendant,246 even though the Guidelines Manual never
mentioned the characteristic at issue.27 They have erroneously given policy
statements the force of guidelines, even though the Commission and the
Department of Justice construed the SRA as meaning that the opposite is
true.'
A number of circuits have reviewed comparatively few appeals from
downward departure sentences in the past two years, despite Commission
statistics showing that departures occur frequently.249 Some observers believe
that the perceived hostility of a circuit court toward downward departures is
responsible, not for fewer departures in the district courts, but for fewer appeals
245. For example, in the period from January 1990 through January 1992, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed or remanded nearly two-thirds of appealed departure cases. During the same time period,
by way of contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed nearly two-thirds of appealed departure
cases. For further elaboration of appellate treatment of departure cases, see Daniel J. Freed et al., Variations
Among Courts of Appeals in Reviewing Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (study-in-
progress, on file with author).
Appellate courts have reversed or remanded numerous cases in which the district court departed based
on offender characteristics. See, e.g., United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107 (Ist Cir. 1990) (defendant's
rehabilitation improper basis for departure); United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254 (Ist Cir. 1990) (district
court's finding that defendant posed little or no risk to community improper basis for departure); United
States v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1990) (defendant's military record not sufficiently meaningful to
warrant departure).
246. See United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 1II S. Ct. 353 (1990). See
generally 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 161-98 (1989-1990) (issue discussing offender characteristics); 3 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 8-34 (1990) (same).
247. The Guidelines Manual never mentions pregnancy. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1. "In determining
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration," the SRA requires the court to "consider
only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission."
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
248. See infra Part .B.I.
249. The Commission, in its annual reports and impact reports, keeps track of the frequency of
departures by sampling 25% of all sentencing cases during a certain time period. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 15, tbl. C-5; 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, tbl. C-5; U.S.S.C. IMPAcT REPORT, supra
note 2, at 205-41. By extrapolating the Commission's sample to annual totals and by studying appealed
departures, an ongoing study by Manuel Abascal, Bruce Smith, and me estimates that upward departures
are about 15 times more likely to be appealed than downward departures. See Freed et al., supra note 245.
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of those departures to the circuit courts.20 Through negotiated settlements,
appeal waivers, or informal acquiescence, many participants in the trial process
seem to be deciding for themselves that departures are necessary, and that the
guidelines and the appeals courts are too strict.
To the extent that these informal decisions deprive appellate judges of a
meaningful overview of the sentencing process in action, they increase the
likelihood of uncorrectable disparity between dispositions settled by negotiation
and cases reviewed on appeal; and between departures by flexible district
judges who relax the rigor of the guidelines and refusals to depart by others
who prefer to enforce or acquiesce in guideline prescriptions.
B. The Gap Between Statutory Principles and Circuit Court Case Law
This section examines how courts of appeals have misinterpreted the SRA.
Torn between enforcing the unpopular guidelines of an administrative agency
that sentences no one and respect for the expertise and the firsthand experience
of district judges who sentence everyone, appeals judges seem to have opted
in favor of the agency. Unintentionally and perhaps unknowingly, strict appel-
late rulemaking has failed to balance the distant guidance of a bureaucracy
against the detailed responsibility of the individual sentencer.
Appellate courts are obliged to review Commission compliance with the
SRA, as well as individual sentences. These functions are intertwined but not
the same. By reviewing a sentence solely in relation to an applicable guideline,
a court of appeals treats the guideline as though it were a freestanding act of
Congress. But Congress did not enact the guidelines, and the President did not
sign them. They are limited rules that become binding only through designated
procedures, and they remain subordinate to the overriding statute. Reviewing
agency actions is hardly a new task for appellate courts; they are accustomed
to dealing with administrative agencies and to ensuring that the agencies
comply with the governing statutes. There is no good reason for failing to
ensure that Commission guidelines comply with the standards of the SRA.
By departing from an applicable guideline range, a district court expresses
the view that the Commission's guidance does not adequately address the facts
of the case. Whenever a court of appeals reviews the challenged sentence, it
has a duty to consider four questions:
(1) whether the particular guideline or policy statement at issue was
authorized by the SRA and complies with the statutory directive
250. Francesca D. Bowman, The Greening of Probation Officers in Their New Role, 4 FED. SENTENC-
ING REP. 99, 100 (1991) ("[Iln calendar year 1989 there were 36 court-initiated downward departures (of
a total of 168 defendants sentenced under the guidelines); only three were taken up on appeal.").
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to be "consistent with all pertinent provisions of this title [28] and
title 18"; 2s
(2) whether the provision in question is a presumptively binding
guideline or an advisory policy statement;
(3) whether the aggravating or mitigating circumstances that led a
district judge to depart from the guideline was "of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission";%52 and
(4) whether the guidelines, and their judicial interpretations, have
produced a sentence that implements the statutory objective to
"avoid unwarranted sentence disparities." 53
These four questions are central to a responsible judicial interpretation of
guideline validity. They underlie, and sometimes undermine, important actions
taken by way of guidelines, policy statements, or judicial decisions.
The first question-whether the guideline or policy statement is authorized
by and consistent with the statute-has already been analyzed in our discussion
of policy statement 5Kl.1, dealing with substantial assistanceY 4 Courts of
appeals have failed heretofore to notice two errors made by the Commission:
(1) that insofar as 5Kl purports to implement 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), it goes
beyond the statute by adding the unauthorized prerequisite of a government
motion before the district judge can exercise discretion to reduce a nonmanda-
tory sentence; and (2) that section 5KI.1 is denominated a policy statement,
which is inconsistent with Congress' instruction that § 994(n) be implemented
by way of a guideline. The Commission should amend 5Kl.1 to correct these
mistakes. Regardless, district judges and appellate courts should not hesitate
to implement 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) by invalidating 5Kl.l's requirement that a
government motion precede judicial consideration of sentence reductions in
cases not involving mandatory penalties.
The subsections that follow deal with the three remaining issues.
1. Not Distinguishing Policy Statements from Guidelines
A major deficiency in trial court and appellate interpretations of the Guide-
lines Manual lies in the failure to appreciate the distinction between a policy
statement and a guideline. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Williams
v. United States refers to the guideline/policy statement relationship, but never
articulates the differences and similarities between them.25
251. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
253. Id. § 3553(a)(6) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (1988).
254. See supra Part IILC.2.c.
255. In March 1992, the Supreme Court referred to the policy statement/guideline relationship in
Williams v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W. 4206 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1992). Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
called the relevant policy statement "an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable guideline." Id.
at 4209. In sentencing Williams, the district court had departed upward based in part on his prior arrest
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"Guidelines" attain presumptive authority (subject to judicial review for
consistency with the SRA) by being submitted to Congress, after a prescribed
administrative hearing process, and surviving the six-month congressional
report-and-wait period.
"Policy statements,"z 6 on the other hand, need follow no procedural due
process or time schedule. They are not subject to legislative review. The SRA
provides no route by which a policy statement may receive congressional
endorsement, by silence or otherwise. The Department of Justice instructed U.S.
Attorneys in its 1987 Prosecutors Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines that
"policy statements... only provide general advisory statements which are not
binding," and "[a] court is not required to abide by a policy statement suggest-
ing a departure from the guidelines even though a factor is present in the case
which is addressed by such a policy statement and insufficiently addressed by
the guidelines themselves. ' z7
Similarly, the Commission states in chapter 7 of the Guidelines Manual
that "policy statements are not subject to the May 1 deadline for submission
to Congress ... [and] provide better opportunities for evaluation by the courts
and the Commission."' 58
Courts have repeatedly overlooked the policy statement label and its
nonbinding status. Instead, they give policy statements the same effect as
guidelines. The Commission cannot be faulted for these judicial errors. Rather,
courts and the attorneys who argue before them are to blame. Courts have
misread the Guidelines Manual and not read the SRA, while attorneys have
failed to challenge the courts' misconceptions.
For example, a number of courts have failed to note that a section they
called a "guideline" was in fact a clearly marked "policy statement." 9 Some
have noted the words but ignored the distinction? Others note the distinc-
record, despite a policy statement making that factor invalid. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 4A1.3. The court
of appeals affirmed the sentence despite finding that the trial judge had erred in considering the arrest record.
The Supreme Court remanded for a determination of "whether the sentence was imposed 'as a result of'
the District Court's erroneous consideration of his prior arrests not resulting in prosecution." Id. at 4210
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (1988)). The majority did not address the policy statement/guideline
distinction discussed in this Article. In dissent, Justices White and Kennedy made more of the distinction,
arguing that "[e]ven though policy statements are numbered and grouped in the Guidelines Manual by means
identical to actual guidelines, their purpose is limited to interpreting and explaining how to apply the
guidelines." Id. at 4212 (White, J., joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
256. 28 U.S.C. §§ 9 9 4 (p), (x) (1988).
257. PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 7 (emphasis omitted).
258. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(a); see also supra note 161 and accompanying text.
259. United States v. O'Brien, 950 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203
(5th Cir. 1991); United States v. White, 945 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mondello, 927 .2d
1463 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990); United States Daiagi, 892 .2d
31 (4th Cir. 1989); Garoppolo, supra note 212, at 4-5.
260. United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991).
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tion, but imply that it does not make any difference.2 61 Some say or imply
that the difference is significant, but the outcome suggests that it was not. 2
There are a few striking exceptions to this litany of errors,23 signifying that
at least some trial judges and some appellate judges265 have carefully read
the SRA and the Guidelines Manual.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with the Commission formulating policy
statements and the courts following them. Judges clearly ought to respect sound
advice offered by the Commission, regardless of whether it is binding. The real
issue arises when a trial judge believes that a policy statement will produce an
unjust result in a particular case: should nonbinding advice, for which the
Commission offers inadequate justification and which contradicts prior justice
system practice, be imposed on district courts simply because the Commission
printed it in the Guidelines Manual?
It is rare for appellate courts to misread repeatedly the same statute and its
administrative interpretations, yet they have done so on this issue. Because stare
decisis serves no useful purpose when injustice and disparity follow in the
courts below, it would be appropriate to reconsider earlier rulings.
2. Not Testing the "Adequacy" of Guideline Consideration
The word "adequately" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) deserves special emphasis
because the statute did not make mere Commission "consideration" the test of
guideline legitimacy and enforceability. Congress nowhere stated or implied
that the Commission's mention of a factor in a sentencing guideline, policy
261. United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63 (2d
Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991); United
States v. Chotas, 913 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 1421 (1991); United States v.
Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1989).
262. United States v. Kelley, No. 90-1027, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1445 (8th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992) (en
banc).
263. United States v. Lee, No. 91-6079, 1992 WL 27639 (10th Cir. Feb 19, 1992) (holding that policy
statements in chapter 7 on supervised release are advisory rather than mandatory but must be considered
by trial court); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989); see also
United States v. Stinson, No. 90-3711, 1992 WL 56040 (1lth Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (holding official
commentary not binding until Congress amends language of guidelines).
264. See, e.g., United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988),
as authority for departure because Commission did not adequately consider loss of parental rights due to
incarceration); United States v. Gerard, 782 F. Supp. 913 (1992) ("[llt was not Congress' aim to straitjacket
a sentencing court, compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines glass bubble, and
preventing it from exercising its discretion, flexibility, or independent judgment." (citing United States v.
Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1990))); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(Leval, L) (asserting Guidelines Manual permits departure from guidelines in an "atypical" case); United
States v. Birchfield, 709 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (Thompson, L) ("[Tihe court believes that
it is acting within the spirit and fulfilling the purpose of the guidelines in this case.").
265. See Lee, 1992 WL 27639 (Logan, L); Kelley, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1445 (Heaney, L, dissent-
ing); Chotas, 913 F.2d 897 (Clark, L, concurring in part, dissenting in part); Gutierrez, 908 F2d 349, 353
(Heaney, L, dissenting).
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statement, or official commentary would be sufficient to bind a district
court 266 It did not, as the Commission casually asserted in the original Guide-
lines Manual, authorize the Commission to decide for itself that it had adequate-
ly considered a topic. 267 The question of adequacy was specifically delegated
to courts by § 3553(b).
The Commission could certainly say, as it did in section 5K2.0 of the
Guidelines Manual, that it had not adequately considered certain topics. But
whether the converse was true, that it had adequately considered a factor, would
depend in each case on a court's comparison of the facts with the explanation
provided in the Guidelines Manual. If the Commission gave specific consider-
ation in a guideline to an aggravating circumstance-like possession of a toy
gune s -and decided, for example, that the harmlessness of the toy out-
weighed the fear that such replicas can instill in victims; if it showed that it
understood the emotional shock and situational variables involved; and that it
fully weighed the advantages and disadvantages of adding or barring extra
punishment for displaying an unworkable item, then a court, whether or not it
agreed, might have to concede that the Commission's judgment was predicated
on adequate (not "perfect") consideration.
Congress no doubt delegated the evaluation of "adequacy" to the sentencing
court because it considered the judge to be in the best position to evaluate
whether the Commission had sufficiently addressed the aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstance "to the degree''69 present in the case. In United States v.
Diaz-Villafane,270 the First Circuit misread the statute taking the view that
"adequate consideration" was a question of law for the courts of appeals' de
novo review. The appeals court went on to observe that:
District courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh and blood defen-
dants. The dynamics of the situation may be difficult to gauge from
the antiseptic nature of a sterile paper record. Therefore, appellate
review must occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's
266. These are the three sources listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) to which courts are confined when
evaluating the adequacy of consideration of an issue by the Commission.
267. "Thus, in principle, the Commission, by specifying that it had adequately considered a particular
factor, could prevent a court from using it as grounds for departure. In this initial set of guidelines, however,
the Commission does not so limit the Court's departure powers." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.l, pt. A, intro 4(b) (1987) [hereinafter 1987 U.S.S.G.], reprinted in
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, at 132. In 1990, the Commission deleted the quoted language by amendment
307, accompanied with the puzzling explanation that "in the discussion of departures in subpart 4(b),
language concerning what the Commission, in principle, might have done is deleted as unnecessary, but
no substantive change is made." U.S.S.G, supra note 1, app. C., at 138.
268. United States v. Faulkner, 934 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1991) ("As the use of a toy gun during
a crime was clearly a circumstance considered by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines, it may
not serve as a basis for departure from the Guideline range.").
269. The language "to a degree" was added to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) by the Sentencing Act of 1987,
thereby intensifying the sentencing court's duty to review the adequacy of Commission consideration. Pub.
L. No. 100-182, § 3(l)-(2), 101 Stat. 1266, 1266.
270. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).
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superior "feel" for the case. We will not lightly disturb decisions to
depart, or not, or related decisions implicating degrees of depart-
ure.
271
The appeals court acknowledged in this statement the importance of case
facts when evaluating the appropriateness of a departure. But it overlooked the
statute's instruction that those facts must be directly linked to the issue of the
"adequacy" of the Commission's consideration: § 3553(b) tells the court to
determine whether the factual circumstances in the case before it are "of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission." This is the essence of a mixed question of fact and law272
"Adequately considered" provides the SRA's pivotal test for guarding
against ill-considered guidelines and against needless rigidity in applying an
otherwise sensible guideline to cases in which the kind or degree of circum-
stances warrant departure. The problem for courts trying to apply the test,
however, is that the Commission, both in its original guidelines, and in 435
amendments from 1987 through 1991, has failed to articulate sufficiently the
reasons for the various sentences mandated.273
Some might argue that this construction of "adequate consideration"
imposes too great a burden on the Commission and the courts. For a court
making the inquiry in a fact-specific context, review of "adequate consider-
ation" is not difficult, especially when the Commission's published "consider-
ation" is so thin. For the Commission, we also know that the burden of provid-
ing explanations for its guidelines is not so great; it has successfully done so
before. In its Introduction to the 1987 Guidelines Manual, the Commission set
forth a wide-ranging and fascinating account of its views on several major
271. Id. at 49-50.
272. On each occasion, a court should ask: how carefully did the Commission consider the kind and
degree of facts present in this case? The First Circuit's error in labeling such an inquiry a question of law
is illustrated by the way it applied that test to the Diaz-Villafane facts. It reviewed five categories of facts
to see if they supported the district court's upward departure: in two categories, dealing with "pending
charges" and the "purity of heroin," it correctly found that the Commission had explicitly considered the
issue and had guided courts to an upward departure. (No question was raised about the adequacy of
Commission consideration.) But in the remaining fact categories, the First Circuit forgot to examine what
the Commission had considered. It simply mentioned three sets of facts and silently assumed that the
Commission had not considered them. Its ruling offers no useful test or precedent for a case in which the
trial court departs and the issue on appeal is whether the Commission considered similar facts in writing
its guidelines. The Diaz-Villafane case is discussed, and the de novo test criticized, in United States v.
Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1990) (Ryan, L concurring); see also Miller & Freed, supra note 101, at
237.
273. See Miller, supra note 28, at 24.
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sentencing topics, setting a high standard for informing the courts and the
public about administrative policymaking for federal sentencing.274
Senate Report 98-225 also sets a high and clearly attainable standard for
reasoned explanations of sentencing principles in a legislative context.275
Through recourse to literature, case law, and illustrations, it provides a rich
portrait of the process of defining principles and procedures for sentencing. It
shows that Congress devoted much care to studying sentencing before enacting
the statute, and it suggests the kind and quality of "reasons" Congress had in
mind when it instructed the Commission to submit its guidelines and each
amendment or modification "accompanied by a statement of reasons there-
for."
27 6
If the Senate Judiciary Committee, with a host of legislative topics on its
agenda, could provide a volume of well-considered reasons to explain its
guidance to the Commission, surely the Commission, charged with the duty to
"establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice
system that.., reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge
of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process, 277 could do
at least as well in its guidance to the federal courts.
The process by which the Commission could articulate the evolution of
policymaking is not hard to envision. The Commission produced the 200-page
Guidelines Manual in its first year. By mid-1988, district courts began applying
the guidelines in large numbers of cases and submitting detailed case reports
to the Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(w). By 1989, the courts of
appeals were issuing opinions in large numbers of sentence review cases.
Judges, lawyers, and scholars expected that the Commission would begin
revising and annotating the Guidelines Manual, offering leading case citations,
judicial opinion quotations, and its own analysis and commentary on the
evolving application of law to sentencing issues and recurring factual situations.
This sort of commentary would provide on a policy level what case law
provides for individual cases: an explanation of rules, their origins, their
reasoning, their exceptions, their modifications over time, and their rationality
in a complex system.
274. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A. It is therefore puzzling that it never did so again, especially
with regard to guideline provisions that encountered substantial resistance. Thomas W. Hillier H, The
Commission's Departure from an Evolutionary Amendment Process, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 45 (1991);
see also Leonard Orland, Corporate Punishment by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 50, 52 (1991) (in promulgating organizational sentencing guidelines, Commission "acted without an
articulated theoretical or empirical justification").
275. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 9 94 (p) (1988). The reasons required by this section should be sufficient to satisfy
the "adequacy of consideration" test in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). See Leonard Orland, The Commission's
Supplemental Report on Corporate Punishment: Where is the Statement of Reasons?, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 158 (1991).
277. 28 U.S.C. § 991(f)(1)(C) (1988).
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A few courts of appeals have carefully considered the need to explain
sentencing policies.278 Some have acknowledged the flaw in a guideline,
complimented the district judge for pointing it out, but deemed themselves
powerless to take corrective action.279 Most courts of appeals, however,
continue to let the Commission off the hook with regard to demonstrating the
adequacy of consideration underlying key guidelines and policy statements.
If the guidelines were working well in the district courts, the Commission
would have earned credibility with the judiciary by now. But at present, the
opposite is true: avoidance of unreasonable guidance abounds in the interests
of justice, but only at the expense of openness and disparity. District and
appellate courts should begin imposing a high burden of explanation on the
Commission to stimulate "adequate" consideration for each troublesome guide-
line and policy statement.
3. Not Implementing the Instruction to "Reduce Unwarranted Disparity"
In at least three places in the SRA, Congress included instructions to reduce
unwarranted disparity: it admonished judges in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) to "avoid
unwarranted disparities"; and it told the Sentencing Commission in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991(b)(1)(B) and 994(f) to promulgate guidelines and policy statements that
accentuate "certainty and fairness" in sentencing, while reducing "unwarranted
sentence disparities."
Despite these provisions, a number of appellate courts have (1) reversed
district courts when they equalize sentences among codefendants, or (2) de-
clined to review sentences where district courts refused to depart in situations
similar to those in which an appeals court had already sustained a departure.
The courts of appeals should reconsider both lines of cases. They have also (3)
not taken adequate account of the current "hidden disparities" that prevail in
the district courts, and (4) failed to explore sufficiently the consequences of
decisions that require sentencing judges to consider illegal evidence.
a. Equalization
District judges have on occasion departed from the guidelines when they
felt that codefendants merited similar sentences, even though guideline calcula-
tions put them in different ranges. Appellate courts have reversed such deci-
sions, reasoning that the guidelines are designed for nationwide application, and
278. See, e.g., United States v. Takai, 930 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J.).
279. See United States v. Deane, 914 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254
(Ist Cir. 1990).
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that adherence to uniform standards takes precedence over equalization among
individuals convicted in the same courthouse. 2 0
Sentencing Commission statistics show wide variations in sentence lengths
and departure practices among different districts.28 1 So long as the guidelines
demonstrate an inability to prevent gross discrepancies like these, it is counter-
productive for any court to reject sentencing equalization decisions that promote
consistency in the same jurisdiction with the rationale that to do so might
disturb some theoretical (and unrealized) nationwide ideal.
b. Failure To Depart
Appellate courts should also reconsider decisions implying that sentencing
principles established in cases where district judges depart are not binding in
similar situations where judges fail to depart. At present, appellate courts review
departure sentences and make rulings that distinguish between departures that
are appropriate and those that are not. It is therefore anomalous that when
district judges fail to depart, appeals courts say they lack jurisdiction to review.
Such decisions make little sense when they effectively affmn disparity for
defendants denied departure on grounds that a previous appellate court already
ruled appropriate.282
If the SRA offered no possibility for exercising jurisdiction over failures
to depart, it would be incumbent on the judiciary to ask Congress to rectify the
omission. But to decline to review a failure to depart in a situation where, by
so declining, the appellate court is effectively refusing to avoid "unwarranted
disparities" contrary to the SRA must be a misinterpretation of 18 U.S.C.
280. United States v. Gessa, 941 F.2d 265,270 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446,
1447-48 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 441 (1991); United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 73 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 112 (1991); United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 459-61 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Rey, 920 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1084 (1991); United States
v. Enriquez-Munoz, 906 F.2d 1356, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d
1101, 1106-09 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding equalization of defendant whose guideline sentence would have
been longer than that of a more culpable codefendant).
281. Compare, for example, robbery sentence lengths in the Northern District of California (83 months)
with those in the Northern District of Georgia (164 months), 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, app.
B; and departures in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (40%) with those in the Southern District of illinois
(2.9%), id. tbl. C-5.
282. See United States v. Porter, 924 F.2d 395, 399 (Ist Cir. 1991); United States v. Davis, 919 F.2d
1181, 1187 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill I. Ct.
2801 (1991); United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 828 (2d Cir. 1990).
However, some circuits have carved out an exception when the district court judge did not realize that
the guidelines allowed him to depart. See United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 206 (1990); United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d
789 (3d Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding where
unclear whether judge believed he lacked authority to depart).
Some judges and commentators have strongly criticized the appellate courts' failure to review district
court departure decisions. See United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
dissenting); Marc Miller & Daniel I Freed, The Emerging Proportionality Law For Measuring Departures,
2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 225 (1990); David Yellen, Appellate Review of Refusals to Depart, I FED.
SENTENCING REP. 264 (1988).
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§ 3742(a)(2)-which authorizes appeal "as a result of an incorrect application
of the sentencing guidelines."
c. Hidden Disparities
Low visibility dispositions and appeal waivers that shield many of today's
sentences from appellate scrutiny have at least two sources: rigid guidelines and
overly strict appellate standards. Courts of appeals alone cannot change this
environment, but they can take steps to bring the sentencing system more into
the open. Their goal should be to encourage reluctant trial judges to exercise
discretion visibly, to put the actual facts of cases on the record, and to cast light
on hidden disparities as well as on justifiable departures. Appeals courts should
exercise their power to compel Commission reconsideration of unreasonable
guidelines that drive sentencers underground. They should assure district judges
that departures are an essential and respectable part of the system Congress
established, rather than evidence of noncompliance. Moving the system in this
direction would enable the Commission to correct its guidelines on the basis
of visible departure experience that exposes flaws in the underlying guidelines.
d. Illegal Evidence
A specific illustration of decisions that encourage hidden disparities lies
in cases that sustain or require a sentencer's reliance on illegal evidence as a
basis for sentencing.283 Prior to the guidelines, the Supreme Court balanced
the likelihood of deterring Fourth Amendment violations against "the costs of
withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process." '' In review-
ing guideline sentences, however, appellate courts should not ignore the relevant
conduct consequences discussed earlier: enhancing a sentence on the basis of
unadjudicated conduct gives prosecutors an incentive to drop dubious charges
and later enhance a sentence based on information underlying those charg-
es. 285
The Second Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Tejada"6 sug-
gests that the Court may not have realized the extent to which its decision will
encourage investigative agencies to lessen their concerns about the legality and
admissibility of evidence. In ruling that illegally obtained evidence was admissi-
ble to determine the defendant's guideline sentence, the court held that "[a]bsent
a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a
283. United States v. Tejada, No. 91-1071, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2921, at *18-20 (2d Cir. Feb 21,
1992).
284. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
285. See supra Part II.C.2.d (discussing U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3).
286. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2921.
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district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even
if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Such a rule under the guidelines turns the goal of legality in police investi-
gations upside down. Because of the expansive relevant conduct approach
provided by the guidelines, the prosecutor in Tejada, who had to drop firearm
possession charges at trial because the evidence was illegally obtained, was still
able to use the defendant's illegal gun possession to enhance the sentence for
related drug charges. Together, the Tejada decision and the guidelines' relevant
conduct approach significantly reduce the disincentives for police and prosecu-
tors to obtain illegal evidence. Except where there is proof that a specific desire
to enhance sentencing motivated the illegal search, district courts following
Tejada will be obliged to consider the relevance of the illegal evidence to an
enhanced sentence. If fairness in sentencing is a goal of the SRA-and surely
28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B) and 994(f) state that it isM8-why should a court
of appeals turn guideline sentencing into a process that rewards police illegality
by inflating the target's punishment? 9
Decisions like Tejada also compound the problems of informal noncompli-
ance with the guidelines. As noted earlier, the "sentencers" who participate in
the district court process resist unjust rules in all sorts of ways. Thus, an
appellate rule that encourages the use of illegal evidence will likely encounter
resistance from many prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. As defense
counsel become knowledgeable of the harsh new rule, they will strive to
condition guilty pleas on the AUSA's agreement not to offer illegal evidence
at sentencing. Some prosecutors will do so as a matter of personal policy. Some
judges will reject plea bargains that are predicated on illegal evidence. Howev-
er, other prosecutors and judges will use illegal evidence to enhance sentences.
Because neither the Commission nor an appeals court can stop lower court
participants from respecting Fourth Amendment values, needless, unwarranted,
hidden disparity contrary to the SRA will result.
VI. RETHINKING THE GUIDELINES
There are at least two approaches to reducing unwarranted sentencing
disparity: a legislature or outside agency can try to force it out of the system
with severe rules; or courts, in cooperation with an agency, can probe the
causes of disparity and evolve agreed-upon principles and norms to help
sentencers achieve greater consistency. The latter is a peaceful route; the former
spells trouble.
287. Id. at *19-20 (emphasis added).
288. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)(B) (1988) (listing "fairness" as one of Commission's purposes); id. § 994(0
(1988) (instructing Commission to pay particular attention to "fairness in sentencing").
289. See Pilchen, supra note 85, at 115.
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The U.S. Sentencing Commission chose the former. The district courts,
substantially divided, have tended to acquiesce passively, criticize the new
regime, or avoid unpalatable sentences by endorsing negotiated settlements. The
courts of appeals, less divided, have tended to do just the opposite. They have
enforced the Commission's rigid approach and have been unconcerned with
system impact. This concluding part briefly examines what went wrong and
suggests changes.
A. What Went Wrong?
Since the passage of the SRA, the Commission and the courts have played
major roles in creating a sentencing system that works poorly. The Commission
has three continuing problems-unbalanced membership, inadequate research,
and mixed messages about departures-all of which hamper its ability to create
workable guidelines. The judiciary, largely through misinterpretation of the
SRA and the Guidelines Manual, has compounded the Commission's failures.
1. The Sentencing Commission
a. Membership
In retrospect, the trouble began with the appointment of the Commission's
initial seven members. These were men and women of quality and high regard
in their respective professions, but not leaders in the lengthy effort for sentenc-
ing reform. The Commission consisted of five men and two women: three
judges (two court of appeals, one district court), a correctional official, and
three professors-an economist, a sociologist, and a criminal law scholar.290
Several members had prior congressional staff experience, and one was an
acknowledged expert in administrative law.
None of the members had extensive experience in sentencing offenders in
a high-volume urban court. There was no U.S. Attorney or line prosecutor with
recent trial experience in contemporary federal crime, no federal defender or
private attorney skilled in criminal representation and sentencing advocacy, and
no federal probation officer who had analyzed a wide range of offender charac-
teristics or devised punishment options to match offenders' risks or rehabilita-
tive potential.
No member had significant experience with the process of change, with
efforts to reform the criminal justice system, or with the obstacles to modifying
290. The original Commissioners were: Stephen G. Breyer, Judge (now Chief Judge), 1st Cir.; Michael
K. Block, Professor of Law, Policy & Economics, University of Arizona; Helen G. Corrothers, U.S. Parole
Commissioner;, George E. MacKinnon, Senior Judge, D.C. Cir.; Ilene H. Nagel, Professor, Indiana University
School of Law; Paul H. Robinson, Professor, Rutgers School of Law; William W. Wilkins, Jr., Judge, D.
S.C. (now Fourth Circuit).
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a multidiscretionary decisionmaking process with long traditions and specialized
roles.291 In retrospect, the Commission acted as though it were unfamiliar with
incremental approaches to change and with the futility of imposing radical rules
on a complex system.
There was important precedent for the Commission's task, a five-year
precedent that demonstrated the sort of sensitivity to issues of change from
which a novice agency could benefit: the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission.292 As Dale Parent, its first staff director, recounts, the chair of
Minnesota's Commission, Jan Smaby, devised an "open process of guideline
development" to respect "the balance of divergent interests in criminal justice.
Sources of opposition had to be identified and neutralized. Sources of support
had to be located and nurtured." 293 When discussions "revealed deep and
intense divisions, she often deferred decisions, giving all parties time to seek
additional information or accommodations." 294 The open process "enhanced
the acceptability of the emerging guidelines., 295
As the U.S. Sentencing Commission's initial guidelines came into general
use and noncompliance became evident, it gained exposure to the dimensions
of system resistance and to the desires of the federal judiciary and the organized
bar to become participants in the process of change.296 When Congress finally
directed the Commission in 1989 to examine the impact of mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes,297 the Commission mounted a comprehensive study of
how judges, prosecutors, and others were responding to a rigid system of severe
prison penalties. In August 1991 the Commission reported that massive evasion
and nullification of the congressionally imposed penalties had emerged.298 In
a wide-ranging and thoughtful analysis, it recommended that Congress desist
from mandating minimum sentences, a hopeful sign in the Commission's own
learning process.'
Readers of the report cannot avoid observing the resemblance between the
statutory mandates the Commission condemned and the guideline mandates its
291. See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE (1978); SOCIAL HISTORY
AND SOCIAL POLICY (David J. Rothman & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1981); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID
K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979); MALCOLM M.
FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: THE CIsis OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE LEAA
(1980).
292. It is also important to note the membership differences between the two commissions. Minnesota
had a public defender, a state's attorney, the commissioner of corrections, and citizen members, in addition
to experienced trial judges and others. See PARENT, supra note 7, at 31-32.
293. Id. at 45.
294. Id. at 47.
295. Id. at 48.
296. See The Sentencing Commission and Its Critics, supra note 122, at 205-52 (statements of Judges
Becker, Broderick, and Wolf).
297. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1703, 104 Sta. 4789, 4845-46 (1990).
298. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 4.
299. Id. at iv, 33-34, 124.
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own Guidelines Manual contained. 3° So far, however, the Commission seems
not to have noticed."'
While it may not be too late for the Commission to reform itself from
within, its unbalanced membership and lack of experience with what Raymond
Nimmer called "the nature of system change"3' are impediments that may
be difficult to overcome.
b. Research
In launching a study of federal sentencing, the Commission failed to devote
sufficient attention to uncovering the sources of disparity among judges. Pre-
SRA studies found differences in the sentences different judges gave in the
same or similar cases,30 3 but devoted insufficient research to finding the roots
of those differences. Judges confronted with disparity studies usually asserted
that disparity was overstated. They felt that the differences lay more in the
individuality of the cases than in the identity of the judges.304 Every case was
unique-in the circumstances of the crime, the history and characteristics of
the offender, and the variables in case processing. Until researchers could study
different sentences in nearly identical, real-life cases, judges thought, they
would not know whether the "disparity" was warranted or unwarranted. In
drafting the SRA, Congress made it clear that "unwarranted disparities," not
explainable differences, were the target.
With this issue of meaningful differences in mind, it is instructive to look
at how the Commission actually studied it. In its June 1987 Supplementary
Report, which followed the initial submission of proposed guidelines to Con-
gress, the Commission said it had analyzed data drawn from 10,000 "augmented
presentence reports" and the ensuing sentences in order to learn which distinc-
tions were important.305 But probation officers write presentence reports,
while judges impose sentences. Examining presentence reports told the Com-
mission much about what was furnished in writing to judges, but little about
how judges themselves processed sentencing information, considered individual
offender differences, and determined which purpose or purposes dominated in
different kinds of cases.
300. See Tonry, supra note 168, at 131-32.
301. For a contrary view, i.e., that the mandatory penalty system is in fact a good idea that is working
well, see Mueller, supra note 219.
302. NIMMER, supra note 291.
303. See sources cited supra note 9; infra Part LA.; see also, e.g., Karlton Letter, supra note 10, at
186 ("[Tlhe goal of uniformity in sentencing presupposes a uniformity of crime and criminals which simply
does not exist.").
304. Cf. BLUMSTEIN ET AL, supra note 30, at 75 (noting "appearance of disparity" exists "when cases
seem alike to an outside observer but differ materially in case attributes observed by the judge").
305. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INrIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND POLCY STATEMENTS 9 (1987).
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The Commission's study failed to describe the extent to which the addition-
al factfinding judges engaged in after receiving the presentence reports affected
their sentences; what purposes judges connected to what sorts of crimes or
offenders, leading to what sorts of sentences; what sanctioning options judges
considered or would have considered had the resources existed; what prior cases
and system norms judges found to be useful precedents; how judges dealt with
an offender's substance abuse, employment record, dependents, or community
ties; or what feedback was gleaned from comparing judges' nonprison sentences
with prison sentences for similar offenders. From what the Commission dis-
closed in its Supplementary Report, it apparently spent little time systematically
studying judges and the process of formulating sentences: talking with judges;
observing them in action; interviewing prosecutors, probation officers, and
defenders about judges; and discovering the wisdom accumulated over years
on the bench.
The Commission wrote its guidelines in a partial vacuum, based primarily
on prison sentence statistics and presentence reports, omitting consideration of
the judgment and thinking processes of the judges who produced those sentenc-
es. Perhaps as a result, the Commission's guidelines also underestimated the
interactions of judicial discretion with discretion exercised by other "sentenc-
ers," the critical role that purpose plays in formulating an appropriate sentence,
and the pervasive importance of an offender's "history and characteristics" to
individualized sentencing.
The Commission saw a system in which it wished to impose uniformity.
To do this, it described a "heartland," but failed to recognize how often cases
in real life warranted sentences outside that region. The Commission's research,
in short, did not give it a sufficient appreciation of the district court environ-
ment for which guidelines were intended.
c. Mixed Messages About Departures
Another problem arose from the conflicting messages sent by the Commis-
sion to those interpreting and applying the guidelines. The guidelines were
greeted in 1987 with press reports about how the Commission was taking
discretion away from judges, but the Introduction to the Guidelines Manual
conveyed a more modest message. It discussed the choices confronted in the
policymaking process, and the sources, strengths, and weaknesses of the
guidance adopted. The Introduction suggested considerable flexibility in the
Commission's approach to guidance, but the rest of the volume hardly vindicat-
ed that approach.
After describing how it might have exercised its power to curtail departures,
the Introduction said: "the Commission does not so limit the courts' departure
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powers." 6 It expressly invited judges to depart in unusual cases. It described
a "heartland" based on "typical cases embodying the conduct that each guide-
line describes," and said that where courts find "conduct [that] significantly
differs from the norm," they should consider whether departure is warranted.
Except for eight itemized factors,3 c7 the Commission said that it "does not
intend to limit the kinds of factors (whether or not mentioned anywhere else
in the guidelines) that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual
case." 30 It also mentioned that "single acts of aberrant behavior... still may
justify probation at higher offense levels through departures." 3°
The Commission speculated that its guidance would probably prove accept-
able "to those who seek more modest, incremental improvements in the status
quo.., and who recognize that these initial guidelines are but the first step
in an evolutionary process." 310 It acknowledged the "difficulty of foreseeing
and capturing a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision."' Noting that
it was a permanent agency, it expected that the guidelines would develop "with
progressive changes, over many years." 3 By "monitoring when courts de-
part... and by analyzing their stated reasons," it would be able over time "to
create more accurate guidelines. 313
The strict language of the guidelines and policy statements themselves,
however, undercut this modest message. Readers of these mixed messages had
a clear choice: they could assume that the Introduction authoritatively spelled
out a policy of flexibility, under which departures were welcome, or they could
interpret each guideline strictly as though it were written in stone.
The next two sections examine how these conflicting messages were
received.
2. District Courts
District judges have reacted reflexively to the latter message. They have
roundly criticized the guidelines, accepting the publicity about diminished
discretion rather than carefully studying the statute and the Guidelines Manual
to gain a comprehensive sense of how one might do justice under the new
system. Relatively few judges seem to have read the Introduction; hardly any
306. 1987 U.S.S.G., supra note 267, ch.1, pt. A, intro 4(b), reprinted in U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app.
C, at 132.
307. Id. (listing § 5H1.10 (race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status), § 5H1.4 (drug
and alcohol dependence), and § 5K2.12 (personal financial difficulties or economic pressures) as invalid
grounds for departure).
308. Id.
309. Id. at intro. 4(d), reprinted in U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, at 134.
310. Id. at intro. 3, reprinted in U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, at 130.
311. Id. at intro. 4(b), reprinted in U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, at 132-33.
312. Id., reprinted in U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, at 133.
313. Id.
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have referred to it when stating sentencing reasons. After Mistretta validated
the Commission in 1989,314 judges lamented that their hands were tied, their
power reduced.
Then and now, large numbers of judges have seemed unaware of the
elasticity and latitude left open under the SRA and the Guidelines Manual. Few
have realized the extent to which the statute empowers them to hold the
Commission's guidelines accountable to specific instructions and virtually
requires them to depart when the prescribed sentence seems inappropriate. Few
have invoked or even mentioned the statutory rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that
sentences must be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to comply with
designated statutory purposes.
Nor have many district judges invoked the purposes-of-sentencing provi-
sions of § 3553(a)(2) to shape sentences differently, depending on whether they
have thought it necessary, for example, "to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant," or to impose "educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment" as a more appropriate purpose.
Dismayed by chapter 5H policies that discourage reliance on offender
characteristics, few judges have seemed aware of explicit authority elsewhere
in the Guidelines Manual, as well as in the statute, for taking these traditional
considerations into account. They have seemed oblivious to the individualizing
factors--"the history and characteristics of the offender"--that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) requires them to consider. Judges have also seemed oblivious to the
prohibition against limiting a court's consideration of "information concerning
the background, character and conduct of a defendant"3 5 when determining
a sentence within the guideline range, or departing from the range. Few have
recognized the significance of the Commission's labeling of its chapter 5H "not
ordinarily relevant" policies as policy statements instead of binding guidelines.
Few have realized that even if a characteristic is not ordinarily relevant, the
statement clearly invites a finding that it is relevant on some occasions.
The themes of Commission accountability, sentencer flexibility, and a
statutory duty to depart offer abundant opportunities for district courts to take
affirmative action to sentence justly and depart from flawed guidance. Congress
has provided for an interactive system, involving judges and Commissioners,
in which district courts can verify Commission compliance with the SRA and
departures can provide feedback, leading ultimately to improvements as the
guidelines evolve. The record of the first five years, however, suggests that
sentencers, collectively, have fallen short of the pivotal role Congress has
invited them to play.
314. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
315. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § IBIA (same).
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3. Courts of Appeals
Appellate courts have reacted similarly to publicity about the district courts'
loss of sentencing discretion. Many appeals court judges have adopted a strict
enforcement approach, holding district courts accountable to unquestioned
guidelines, but not holding the Commission and its guidelines accountable to
the SRA.
Appeals courts have also avoided reading the Introduction to the Guidelines
Manual, choosing instead to enforce policy statements as though they were
guidelines, and curtailing the statutory duty to depart as though it was a sin to
venture outside the guideline range. Courts of appeals have acted more like
super-sentencing commissions. They have assumed the role of protectors and
elaborators of the guidelines, rather than the role of sentence reviewers, who,
as 18 U.S.C. § 3742 suggests, defer to the knowledge and firsthand experience
of the sentencing judge.
In short, appeals courts seem to have adopted an almost conclusive pre-
sumption of administrative expertise that the Commission in its first five years
has not earned and that the statute does not contemplate.
B. Where to Next?
The judiciary, the Commission, and Congress should take a number of steps
to redress deficiencies in the current guidelines system. Most do not require
new legislation. They do, however, necessitate a change of attitude on the part
of decisionmakers firmly set in their ways.
The surge of mandatory penalties enacted by Congress in recent years316
signifies a different political environment for sentencing reform compared to
the mood that prevailed when the SRA became law. This altered context might
lead some to consider the following proposals unrealistic. So be it; they are
offered not as predictions of the future, but as lessons distilled from the past.
316. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 4, app. A (listing statutory provisions
requiring mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment); see also id. app. B (listing pending mandatory
minimum legislation).
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1. The Judiciary
The judiciary is uniquely positioned to take the lead in reforming the
current sentencing process. Since it appears that neither Congress nor the
Commission is willing to correct deficiencies without prodding, the judiciary
should act as the prod.
a. Courts of Appeals
Federal appellate courts should begin holding the Commission accountable
as an agency of limited powers. The appeals courts should ensure that the
guidelines conform to the detailed SRA provisions in titles 18 and 28 of the
United States Code. They should accord greater deference to district court
sentencing experience. As appellate panels become knowledgeable about
noncompliance on the district court level, they should reconsider strict enforce-
ment of guidelines that are encouraging manipulation and avoidance instead of
respect for law.
An appeals court considering a sentencing case might, for example, request
data on the disposition of similar cases in the court below, thereby exposing
itself to the universe of sentences the criminal docket is producing, rather than
taking account only of the fraction of cases it reviews directly. Perhaps, too,
appellate judges should request occasional assignments to criminal cases in a
district court to gain insight on how the guidelines are affecting sentencing
judges.317 Such experience may hold special value for reassessing the Commis-
sion's relevant conduct rule, the policy statements governing substantial assis-
tance and specific offender characteristics, and previous appellate rulings
rejecting sentence equalization and the reviewability of failures to depart.
A primary focus when reviewing sentence departures should be on confor-
mity of the relevant guideline to the SRA, and on the adequacy of the consider-
ation the Commission gave to the degree of aggravation or mitigation produced
by the circumstances in question. This sort of scrutiny might spur the Commis-
sion to begin spelling out its consideration of these factors in reasoned detail,
much the way courts do in judicial opinions. Such review might inspire the
Commission to reconsider major portions of its Guidelines Manual and to
proceed more cautiously and with better reasons in the amendment process.31
Finally, a court of appeals, when examining a district court's reasons for
departure, should avoid making the statement of reasons so burdensome as to
discourage departures in cases where they would be appropriate. The appeals
317. Even for appeals court judges who once sat on the district court, it may be difficult to appreciate
the complexity of trying to determine relevant conduct under the new system. See, e.g., Cabranes, supra
note 10, at 2 ("[N]o one can pretend to understand the work of federal judges today without some apprecia-
tion of the Guidelines system and what it has done to the courts ... .
318. Miller, supra note 28 (manuscript at 27-29).
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court should recognize the multiple functions served by a sentencing judge's
remarks in the courtroom; crafting reasons for appellate scrutiny is only one
function, and at the moment of sentencing, it is not the most important.
b. District Courts
Sentencers should think twice before continuing to follow the sequence of
mechanical steps itemized by the Commission in Application Instructions
guideline section lB1.3. Judges should instead study the sequence defined by
Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The two chronologies are not the same, and
the guidelines' deviation from the statute clouds its validity. Judges should carry
out the elements of section lB1.3 and the statute in the order that Congress
prescribed:319 the facts of the case should be considered first-i.e., the "nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
offender"-and two key elements of sentencing omitted from the Commission's
Instructions should be brought back into view-the purposes of sentencing and
the policy favoring sentences "sufficient, but not greater than necessary."
Trial judges should question closely any Commission guideline or policy
statement that offends their sense of justice. For example, when a Commission
rule appears likely to produce an unjust sentence, the court might on occasion
invite a Commission representative to attend the sentencing hearing and ask him
to indicate where in the Guidelines Manual the circumstances at issue in the
case were "adequately taken into consideration." 320 Or, the judge might re-
quest counsel for the defendant and the government to discuss in open court
the factors that would have been considered in determining a pre-guidelines
sentence and the extent to which the applicable guidelines, policy statements,
and commentary demonstrate that the Commission took adequate account of
those considerations.
If the court is satisfied, it should apply the guidelines as written. If not, the
sentencing hearing should lay the foundation for a statement of reasons spelling
out guideline deficiencies and justifying a departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
The district judge might ask counsel to suggest a statement of reasons inform-
ing the reviewing court of the facts and purposes on which the sentence was
based, an analysis of what the Commission considered in formulating the
applicable guideline, and why those considerations were inadequate for the
particular facts of the case.
Over time, analyses of this sort could move the guidelines in a direction
that more thoughtfully accounts for the complexity of the sentencing process.
319. See Miller & Freed, supra note 101, at 237.
320. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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c. Judicial Conference of the United States
The Judicial Conference is the governing policy body of the federal court
system. It has become increasingly aware in recent years that the guidelines
command little respect among judges and practitioners. As a consequence, the
Conference has become admirably more assertive in recommending guideline
changes to the Commission and in testifying in opposition to amendments it
deems undesirable.321
The Conference has yet to press its positions on particular changes in the
guidelines system before Congress. Taking this next step would elevate the
importance of the congressional oversight function and no longer concede the
de facto final word on guideline changes to the Commission.
The Judicial Conference should assert itself as a coequal with the Commis-
sion in presenting guideline issues to Congress. Each year it should file an
assessment of the guidelines system and a critique of pending amendments. It
should not assume that Congress is aware of positions that the Conference takes
before the Commission. The Conference should directly request the Judiciary
Committees of the Senate and House to convene hearings to receive testimony
regarding the guidelines system, the loss of confidence in it by courts and
practitioners, and the avoidance and manipulation that rigid and severe guide-
lines are producing.
2. The Sentencing Commission
The Commission should reverse its policy of the first five years and begin
openly responding to the courts. It should cooperatively develop sentencing
guidance with the judiciary, rather than unilaterally prescribe guidelines for the
judiciary. It should also seek to incorporate, to the extent consistent with the
SRA, common law principles traditionally followed by sentencing judges.3n
The Commission should glean principles from the statements of reasons
transmitted by district judges under 28 U.S.C. § 994(w),3' as well as from
informal suggestions from the judiciary.
The Commission should recognize that rules resisted by the multi-discre-
tionary process of district courts can achieve neither the compliance nor the
respect that Congress envisioned. The working hypothesis in the future should
321. See Becker Statement, supra note 10; Cohn & Broderick, supra note 10; Judge Charles P. Kocoras,
N.D. Il., Statement to the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n on behalf of the Judicial Conference Comm. on
Criminal Law and Probation Admin. (Mar. 1990), in 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 240 (1990); Public Hearing,
supra note 10, at 287.
322. For a description of a common law sentencing regime, see WHEELER Er AL., supra note 29.
323. There has been disappointingly little response by the Commission to this potentially valuable
source of judicial principles and suggestions. Section 994(w) requires the Commission to submit at least
annually a report to Congress based on individual case reports, but the description of judicial input and the
Commission's use of it (in annual reports) remains very slim. This might make a fruitful area of research
for scholars with access to the Commission's Washington office.
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be that if judges are given sensible principles to guide sentencing away from
unwarranted disparity and disproportionality, they can be trusted to sentence
consistently.
The Commission might begin by modifying those guidelines and policy
statements that most aggravate the federal district courts: the "not ordinarily
relevant" policy statements in chapter 5H;3 24 the requirement of a government
motion before a judge may consider a substantial assistance departure in
nonmandatory penalty cases under 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) and section 5K1.1;32S
the relevant conduct guideline, section 1B1.3, which is causing so much
confusion and sentence inflation in guilty plea cases; 326 and the presumption
that first offenders must go to prison despite the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 9940).327 It should substantially simplify its forty-three-level guideline matrix.
The Commission should also begin complying with 28 U.S.C. § 994(g),
tailoring its guidelines to the capacity of federal prisons, and simultaneously
embarking on a program to authorize intermediate punishments for nondan-
gerous offenders.
Accompanying the reduction of guideline severity and the relaxation of
guideline complexity should be a Commission-sponsored inquiry into the nature
and causes of system discontent with the guidelines. To ensure respect for the
results of the study, the research team might be jointly appointed by the
Commission and the Federal Judicial Center. Pending the outcome of the study,
the Commission should heed earlier recommendations of the Judicial Confer-
ence to slow down the guideline amendment process.
The goal of these suggestions is to gain the confidence of judges and
practitioners in a guidance system to which they have substantially contributed
and whose policies, standards, and flexibility they are likely to respect.
3. The Congress
Whenever notified that the Commission and the Judicial Conference of the
United States are at odds about guideline policy, the Judiciary Committees of
Congress should give these two institutions a full hearing. Congress should
acknowledge the Judicial Conference as at least an equal with the Commission
in presenting sentencing issues for legislative consideration.
The other major item on the congressional sentencing agenda should be the
removal or modification of mandatory penalty laws, which have led to dismay,
324. See supra Part lII.C.3.
325. See supra Part I.eC.2.c.
326. Goodwin, supra note 133; see also supra Part ILC.2.d.
327. 28 U.S.C. § 9940) (1988) (citing "general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than
imprisonment' for first offenders).
328. See MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 69; Helen G. Corrothers, The Federal Offender: A Program
of Intermediate Punishments, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 23 (1991); see also supra notes 107-08, 147-48 and
accompanying text.
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disparity, and evasion in the federal courts. The mood of unvarnished cruelty
that those penalties symbolize no doubt diminishes the Commission's ability
to moderate its guideline penalty structure in accord with the "sufficient, but
not greater than necessary" principle of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The importance of drastically curtailing mandatory penalties was stated well
by a congressman from Texas, George Bush, more than twenty years ago:
The bill eliminates mandatory minimum penalties, except forprofessional criminals. Contrary to what one might imagine, however,
this will result in better justice and more appropriate sentences. For one
thing, Federal judges are almost unanimously opposed to mandatory
minimums, because they remove a great deal of the court's discretion.
In the vast majority of cases which reach the sanctioning stage today,
the bare minimum sentence is levied-and in some cases, less than the
minimum mandatory is given. This is particularly true in cases where
addict possessors who sell to support their habits are involved, and agreat deal of plea bargaining in this area results. Probations and out-
right dismissals often result.
Philosophical differences aside, practicality requires a sentence
structure which is generally acceptable to the courts, to prosecutors,
and to the general public .... 329
Although the author of that statement has gone on to higher office and to other
views about mandatory penalties, 330 his 1970 analysis retains undiminished
power today.
CONCLUSION
Congress gave the United States Sentencing Commission a difficult task
to perform and not much time to begin carrying it out. At the same time,
Congress began enacting numerous mandatory minimum penalties, a preoccupa-
tion that eight years later has cast a depressing shadow over the Commission's
task. These rigid statutes are wholly at odds with the sort of principled guidance
and permissible individualization of penalties that Congress prescribed in the
SRA. The contemporaneous reign of guidelines and mandatory penalties has
markedly tilted the Commission's work and reduced the tolerance with whichjudges might have responded to guidelines alone.
The early reactions by district courts to the guidelines have made it clear
that, with respect to a number of significant issues, the Commission elected the
wrong policies for federal sentencing reform. While embarking on a mission
329. 116 CONG. REc. H33,314 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1970) (statement of Rep. George Bush), reprinted
in 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 108 (1990).
330. For example, President Bush's 1992 National Drug Control Strategy calls for "[s]tiff mandatory
minimum sentences" for various drug offenses. THE WHrE HoUsE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
151 (1992).
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in which other jurisdictions have succeeded, it has rejected wise lessons from
their experience. It has opted for rigidity rather than flexibility in its approach,
complexity rather than ease of understanding in its guidance, and severity rather
than patient observation and research in its stance.
The Commission has taken a significantly less generous approach to public
access and lessons from the field than did its forerunner in Minnesota. It has
devoted nearly five years to teaching mechanical guidelines to federal probation
officers, lawyers, and judges, instead of learning from them how the existing
guidelines hamper justice in the field. It has responded to statutory departures
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) by suggesting that they evidence noncompliance,
and by trying to plug guideline loopholes rather than by listening to the messag-
es judges, and their sentences, were sending.
The Commission has done nothing to constrain prison sentences within
prison capacity limits, as the SRA instructed. It has failed to implement the
principle of parsimony in punishment that the ALI and ABA began espousing
decades ago, and that Congress incorporated in the SRA. It has not followed
the example of state and local criminal justice systems that experimented with
intermediate punishments in order to avoid unnecessary imprisonment of
nondangerous offenders and unnecessary incursions on public funds in an era
of financial stringency.
Courts of appeals, divided between allegiance to the guidelines and defer-
ence to the district courts, have too often interpreted the guidelines more strictly
than Congress required. Appellate decisions have thereby driven many partici-
pants in the lower courts to evade the guidelines, resolve sentences by agree-
ment, and avoid review.
Appellate courts have made one especially unwise policy choice not
mandated by the statutory language defining the standard for judicial review
of Commission action: they have presumed that the Commission gave adequate
consideration to nearly all of its sentencing policies and choices, instead of
imposing on the Commission the burden of demonstrating in the text of the
Guidelines Manual itself the adequacy of consideration. The adequate consider-
ation standard enables courts to ensure that the Commission sufficiently spells
out its research and reasoning, and the competing considerations it has weighed,
so that judges can decide whether a compelling circumstance, to the degree
present in the case before them, falls inside or outside a guideline.
The Commission has sought to carry out an "evolutionary process" by
forcing new rules on a discretionary system, rather than by articulating princi-
ples that incorporate the wisdom of past cases and trusting that the system will
value those principles and follow them. It ought to have heeded the advice of
Professors Oaks and Lehman in their landmark study of criminal justice in
Chicago:
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The surest way to solve systemic problems is the slowest: to
advocate ideals rather than to institute them. Ideals that are absorbed
by the participants in, and by the clients of, a system are likely to find
expression in the system, and to find expression in ways that do not
disrupt the system. The general pressure of ideals is unlikely to be
disruptive because the demands of those ideals will be put into effect
by people who are subjected to all the pressures of the system. People
so placed will probably act only when they can act without sacrificing
conflicting goals .... One of the most important reasons why judges
are generally limited to the disposition of cases and controversies is
that only in a real case is the judge likely to have presented to him the
real pressures that must be resolved before action is taken.331
Had the Commission better understood the need to go slowly, spent more
time learning about judicial and prosecutorial discretion, and less time attacking
its critics, it might have created a more workable system. Instead, it has pro-
duced growing dissatisfaction by those on the front lines, evidenced by more
and more sentencers consciously avoiding the perceived injustice of the guide-
lines through informal noncompliance. While justice may be served in this way,
it is served at the cost of increasing hidden disparity-the very evil the guide-
lines were intended to cure. Five years is enough time to know that the guide-
lines are heading in the wrong direction. It is time for the judiciary to prod the
Commission and the Congress to get the guidelines back on course.
331. See DALLIN H. OAKS & WARREN LEHMAN, A CRMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT
195 (1968).
1754 [Vol. 101: 1681
HeinOnline -- 101 Yale L.J. 1754 1991-1992
